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IV 
STATEMENT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. While the Court generally 
possesses appellate jurisdiction over cases transferred from the Supreme Court, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (2005), the Court lacks jurisdiction in this case and dismissal is 
appropriate because third-party appellant American Pension Services, Inc. ("APS") has 
never intervened or otherwise been named as a party to this action. See Argument Point 
I, below (addressing lack of jurisdiction). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
First Issue: Does the Court lack jurisdiction over this appeal when APS has never 
intervened or been named as a party in this action? 
Standard of Review: Jurisdictional issues do not involve any review of the trial 
court's rulings, but are questions of law within the exclusive province of the Court on 
appeal. See, e.g., Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, ffif 46-
47, 110 P.3d 678 (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where appellant was not 
named as a party and motion to intervene filed before trial court had not been decided). 
Second Issue: Even if APS had properly preserved a statute of limitations 
argument below, should the trial court have found the alleged fraudulent transfer from 
Learnframe to APS to be time-barred? 
Standard of Review: The applicability of a statute of limitations and any 
corresponding discovery rule is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Spears v. 
Warr, 2002 UT 24, If 32, 44 P.3d 742. Statute of limitations was not preserved below. 
SLC 82657 
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Third Issue: Was there clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's 
determination that Learnframe's attempt to transfer ownership of property in its 
possession was a fraudulent transfer? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact. See 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, U 26 n.3, 63 P.3d 650 ("A mixed question involves 'the 
application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set 
of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.'") (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994)). Construction of the fraudulent transfer statute is a question of law 
to be reviewed for correctness. See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). 
The factual findings supporting a fraudulent transfer are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard, giving deference to the trial court. See id at 425. Moreover, "[t]he 
trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Platts v. 
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997); Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, If 
14,27P.3d538. 
Fourth Issue: Did the trial court correctly apply Rule 64E and Utah Code Ann. § 
25-6-8(2), and in doing so provide sufficient procedural due process to APS when, after 
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court authorized execution on property in Learnframe's 
possession? 
Standard of Review: "The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of 
law that we review for correctness." Oliphant v. Estate of Brunetti, 2002 UT App 375, If 
8, 64 P.3d 587, 590 (quoting Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89, Tf 15, 16 P.3d 540). The trial 
court's application of law to facts presents a mixed question of law and fact. As 
2 
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addressed with respect to the third issue, above, construction of statutory authority is a 
question of law to be reviewed for correctness, while factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error. Whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural 
requirements, like due process, is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See 
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, % 25, 156 P.3d 782. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Several provisions of Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act are of central importance, 
including the following: Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-2, -3, -5, -6, -8, -9 (2005). For 
convenience, the entire statute is attached as Addendum A. Additionally, Rule 64E of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, included as Addendum B, is in issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Kirt Ashton, Clair Bennett, Bradley Mitchell, Todd Nielsen, Brian Pratt, and Paul 
Radvin (the "Employees") commenced this action against their former employer, 
Learnframe, Inc. ("Learnframe") to recover unpaid wages and benefits, and ultimately 
obtained a judgment against Learnframe. [FOF1 f 1.] The judgment was not appealed 
and to date, has not been satisfied. 
1
 References to the trial court record appear as [R.J References to the trial court 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which are attached as Addendum F, appear as 
[FOF Tf ] and [COL f^ ] respectively. The Employees rely on both "findings of fact" 
and "conclusions of law" in this brief as the factual findings of the trial court. 
Mislabeling findings of fact and conclusions of law "does not change their inherent 
character." Coronado Mining Corp', v. Marathon Oil Co., 577 P.2d 957, 960 (Utah 1978). 
Conclusions of law can serve as findings of fact if they contain factual analysis. See 
3 
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After some supplemental post-judgment proceedings, the Employees obtained a 
writ of execution against personal property in the possession of Learnframe. [FOF f 2.] 
Learnframe and one of its creditors, APS, objected to writ and the ensuing constable's 
sale. [FOF j^ 7.] After receiving oral argument on the objections, the trial court 
scheduled an evidentiary hearing at which the parties could appear, call live witnesses, 
and introduce other evidence relating to whether the writ of execution and sale were 
appropriate. [FOF Tf 8.] 
The Employees, APS, and Learnframe each appeared and participated in the 
evidentiary hearing. [R.502.] After the hearing, the Employees and APS proposed their 
respective findings of fact and conclusions of law, and submitted their respective 
objections. [R.503-21, 541-74.] The trial court ultimately entered final findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, overruling Learnframe and APS's objections to the writ of 
execution and constable's sale, and authorizing the Employees to proceed with the sale. 
[R.526-40.] APS, but not Learnframe, appeals from those findings and conclusions. 
IL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Filing of Suit and Entry of Judgment 
1. Between July 2000 and January 2002, the Employees were employed by 
Learnframe. During this time period, Learnframe began failing to pay the Employees 
their wages and other benefits. [FOF f^ 1.] 
Leverentz v. Family Dev. Resources, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 103 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) 
(unpublished opinion) ("While the trial court's decision . . . is a conclusion of law, the 
factual analysis leading to such a conclusion consists of factual findings."). 
SLC 82657 
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2. In December 2002, the Employees instituted a lawsuit against Leamframe 
for these back wages and benefits. [FOF f 1.] 
3. On March 25, 2003, the Employees obtained a judgment against 
Leamframe for the unpaid wages and benefits (the "Judgment"), which Leamframe has 
failed to satisfy. [FOF Tf 1.] (A copy of the Judgment is attached as Addendum C.) 
Supplemental Proceedings 
4. After entry of the Judgment, the Employees instituted various supplemental 
proceedings, seeking to collect the Judgment. Among other things, the Employees 
conducted a debtor examination of Leamframe [Or. in Supp. Proc. Memmott, R.238-48; 
Or. in Supp. Proc. Leamframe, R.256-69] and subpoenaed a creditor of Leamframe, 
American Pension Services, Inc. ("APS") [Subp. of APS, R.249-55]. 
5. In the course of these supplemental proceedings, the Employees discovered 
that one month after they had brought suit against Leamframe, Leamframe signed an 
agreement purporting to transfer ownership over all of its assets—but not possession—to 
another creditor, APS (the "APS Agreement"). [FOF ffij 15, 17.] (A copy of the APS 
Agreement, with attachments, is provided as Addendum D.) 
The Employees' Writ of Execution 
6. In July 2005, the Employees applied for and obtained from the trial court a 
writ of execution (the "Writ of Execution") against all personal property in the possession 
of Leamframe based on the Employees' argument that Leamframe's attempted transfer 
of ownership was a fraudulent transfer that did not preclude execution on assets still in 
SLC 82657 
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Leamframe's possession. [FOF f 2; R.272-80.] (A copy of the Writ of Execution is 
attached as Addendum E.) 
7. Pursuant to Rule 64E of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
memorandum supporting the Employees' motion for writ of execution included the 
amount of the Judgment [R.275]; the nature, location, and estimated value of the property 
[R.273-74, 276]; and the name and address of any person known to the Employees that 
might have an interest in the property, namely APS [R.276]. 
8. A constable served the Writ of Execution on Learnframe, together with 
notice of a constable's sale. [FOF % 3.] 
9. Before the scheduled sale, Learnframe objected to the Writ of Execution 
and requested a hearing. [FOF ^ 4; Opp. to Mot. For Writ of Execution, R.338-43.] 
10. The trial court scheduled a hearing on Leamframe's objection, but 
Learnframe failed to appear at the hearing. [FOF f 5.] 
11. The Employees served a proposed order overruling Leamframe's 
objections to the Writ of Execution and sale, but Learnframe failed to object to the 
proposed order and the Court proceeded to enter it on January 13, 2006. [FOF f 5, 
R.374-77.] 
Two Hearings on Objections to Writ of Execution 
12. After the constable's sale was rescheduled and a notice of sale served on 
Learnframe, Learnframe, APS, and another creditor of Learnframe, Steve Patrick 
("Patrick"), filed separate objections to the sale. [FOF ffif 6-7; R.378-414 (APS); R.346-
351 (Learnframe); R.477-86 (Patrick).] 
6 
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13. After objections were briefed, notwithstanding the trial court's previous 
order overruling Leamframe's objections to the Writ of Execution and sale [R.374-77], 
the trial court scheduled oral argument. The Employees, Learnfrarne, APS, and Patrick 
each appeared, through counsel, and provided argument regarding the Writ of Execution 
and the scheduled constable sale. [Minutes Motion Hearing, Feb. 27, 2006, R.49L] 
14. After oral argument concluded, the trial court scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether the APS Agreement effected a fraudulent transfer, and 
directed the Employees to serve notice of the evidentiary hearing on all interested parties, 
including Leamframe, APS, Patrick, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS"), which had 
levied a tax lien against Leamframe's assets, and any laiown perfected secured creditor of 
Leamframe. [FOF p . ] 
15. The Employees served notice of the evidentiary hearing on Leamframe, 
APS, Patrick, and the IRS. They also served notice on MPI Corp., an alleged perfected 
secured creditor of Leamframe. [FOF f 9; R.497-501.] 
16. Only the Employees, Leamframe, APS, and Patrick appeared at the 
evidentiary hearing. Neither the IRS nor MPI Corp. appeared or filed an objection to the 
Writ of Execution. [FOF ^ 10.] 
17. At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court received exhibits and witness 
testimony, together with oral argument, concerning the objections made to the Writ of 
Execution. All parties who appeared were entitled to introduce evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, and make argument. Based on the evidence and arguments, the trial court 
found that Leamframe's attempt to transfer ownership of the property in its possession 
7 
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was a fraudulent transfer under the Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-5 
and 25-6-6. [COL ^ 8; Minutes of Evidentiary Hearing, June 30, 2006, R.502; Transcript 
of Evidentiary Hearing, June 30, 2006, R.672.] 
18. Due to the fraudulent transfer, the trial court determined that the Employees 
were entitled to proceed with the execution on property in Leamframe's possession, with 
notice to purchasers of the IRS's tax levy. [COL f^ 2S).] 
19. The trial court authorized all parties participating in the evidentiary hearing 
to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and their respective 
objections to the other parties' similar filings. [Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, R.672, 
at 167:13-15, 167:21-23, 168:2-5.] The Employees and APS proceeded to do so. 
[R.526-40 (Employees' proposed findings and conclusions); R.503-21 (APS's objections 
and proposed findings and conclusions); R.522-23 (Leamframe's joinder in APS's 
proposed findings and objections); R.541-74 (Employees' objections to APS's proposed 
findings and conclusions).] 
20. The trial court ultimately entered the Employees' proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. [R.526-40.] 
Findings Regarding Leamframe's Financial Problems 
21. The trial court made the following factual findings regarding the 
circumstances surrounding Leamframe's financial difficulties: 
a. In October 2001, APS loaned $ 1,500,000 to Leamframe and 
received a security interest in one of Leamframe's accounts receivable—a 
$ 1,500,000 receivable from Learn University. [FOF ^ 11.] 
8 
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b. Shortly after October 2001, Leamframe stopped paying its creditors 
as bills became due. Leamframe failed to make payments to the Employees, APS, 
and the IRS, among others. [FOFf12.] 
c. On or about November 11, 2002, the IRS gave notice to Leamframe 
of a federal tax lien in the total amount of $1,767,040.68. [FOF j^ 13.] 
d. In the tax year ending December 31, 2002, Leamframe reported to 
the IRS a $6,882,037 net loss. Leamframe also reported on its tax return that the 
total value of its accounts receivable, inventory, buildings, equipment, intangibles, 
and other assets was $3,376,316. [FOF ^ 14.] 
Findings Regarding the APS Agreement 
22. The trial court made the following factual findings regarding the APS 
Agreement: 
a. On or about January 8, 2003, about a month after the Employees 
obtained the Judgment against Leamframe for unpaid wages and benefits, 
Leamframe entered into the APS Agreement, under which Leamframe agreed to 
transfer "all of its rights[,] title and interest in all of its personal property to APS," 
which "shall also include but not be limited to all of Leamframe rights in software 
it has developed as well as all names, copyrights, patents, and contract rights." A 
list of Leamframe's equipment was attached to the APS Agreement. [FOF ffl[ 1, 
15.] 
b. The APS Agreement permitted Leamframe to purchase back from 
APS for one dollar all of the property transferred to APS after repayment of 
9 
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Leamframe's debt. This option to repurchase property was to expire on January 8, 
2006, three years after the date of the APS Agreement. [FOF f 16.] 
c. Learnframe maintained the right under the APS Agreement to 
continue to use the property it transferred to APS only under three express 
conditions: that Learnframe (1) pay all property taxes; (2) pay all insurance 
premiums; and (3) maintain all equipment in good working order. [FOF f 17.] 
d. APS had the right under the APS Agreement to take immediate 
possession of the assets transferred to APS in the event that Learnframe became 
insolvent. [FOF f 18.] 
Findings Regarding the Elements of Fraudulent Transfer 
23. The trial court made the following factual findings regarding the elements 
of fraudulent transfer: 
APS's Failure to Enforce Learnframe's Default Under the APS Agreement 
a. From the very time it entered into the APS Agreement, Learnframe 
failed to pay all property taxes and insurance premiums with respect to its assets, 
and failed to maintain all of its equipment in good working order. [FOF f^ 17.] 
b. Moreover, Learnframe was insolvent from the moment the APS 
Agreement was signed. [FOF \ 25.] 
c. Notwithstanding Leamframe's failure to comply with the APS 
Agreement from January 2002 and up until the evidentiary hearing before the trial 
court in June 2006, and notwithstanding Leamframe's insolvency throughout this 
SLC 82657 
10 
time period, APS failed to take possession of the property transferred under the 
APS Agreement. [FOF If 19.] 
d. Through the APS Agreement, Learnframe retained possession and 
control of the property transferred, and continued to do so even when it defaulted. 
[FOF 1f 26.] 
Learnframe and APS's Concealment of the APS Agreement 
e. Learnframe never circulated the APS Agreement to its other 
creditors. The APS Agreement was not filed with the Division of Corporations or 
otherwise reported on a UCC-1 filed with the Division. The APS Agreement was 
not supplied to the IRS, which had already levied on the very assets Learnframe 
was purporting to transfer. [FOF % 27.] 
Learnframe Was Insolvent When It Transferred Its Assets to APS 
f. As Learnframe conceded at the evidentiary hearing, at the time it 
entered into the APS Agreement, Learnframe was not paying its debts as they 
became due. The sum of Learnframe's debts far exceeded the value of its assets. 
Learnframe was undergoing severe financial difficulties at the time, having been 
sued or threatened with suit by many creditors, including the Employees. [FOF f 
25; COL f 18.] 
g. In fact, Learnframe entered into the APS Agreement because 
Learnframe was not paying the debt that Learnframe owed to APS. [FOF f 24.] 
SLC 82657 
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Leamframe Transferred Its Assets to APS with Intent to 
Hinder, Delay, or Defraud Its Creditors 
h. After the "transfer" of ownership of assets to APS and up until the 
evidentiary hearing before the trial court, Leamframe maintained possession and 
control of all of its assets. [COL f 22.] 
i. APS still has refrained from removing assets from Leamframe's 
possession, as the APS Agreement permits, even though Leamframe has defaulted 
under the Agreement by not paying taxes, maintaining insurance, and remaining 
solvent. [COL f 22.] 
j . APS and Leamframe failed to disclose the APS Agreement to 
Leamframe's creditors, including the IRS, which had already levied against those 
same assets. [COL f 22.] 
k. Leamframe had been sued or threatened with suit before entering 
into the APS Agreement, including the Employees' collection action filed the 
month before. [COL ^ 22.] 
1. Leamframe transferred all of its assets to APS. [COL f^ 22.] 
m. As detailed above, Leamframe was insolvent or became insolvent 
shortly after entering into the APS Agreement. [COL f 22.] 
The Value of the Assets Transferred Exceeded What Leamframe Received 
n. Through the APS Agreement, APS purported to obtain title to all of 
Leamframe's personal property, including equipment, accounts receivable, 
inventory, copyrights, software, and intellectual property. [FOF \ 23.] 
SLC 82657 
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o. The value of Learnframe's assets as of December 31, 2002, just 
eight days before signing the APS Agreement, was approximately $3,376,316. 
Learnframe admitted this value in its 2002 tax returns. [FOF f 20.] 
p. Even if one were to ignore Learnframe's admission in its tax returns 
of the value of its assets, the testimony of Curtis DeYoung from APS 
demonstrated the great value in Learnframe's assets at the time of the APS 
Agreement. He estimated that the value of Learnframe's assets at the time of the 
APS Agreement was $900,000 for its equipment and other tangible property, plus 
whatever Learnframe's intellectual property was worth. Mr. DeYoung conceded 
that Learnframe had "great potential" because its software, even as of the date of 
the evidentiary hearing, was one of the better software packages in its industry. 
[COL 112.] 
q. Notwithstanding the significant value that APS received through the 
APS Agreement, Learnframe only received in return a forbearance from APS that 
APS would foreclose on the single Learnframe asset in which APS had received a 
security interest—an uncollected (and still uncollected today) receivable from 
Learn University. At that time, APS had no security interest in any other 
Learnframe asset, and would be able to do nothing more than bring suit against 
Learnframe, seek a judgment like the dozens of other creditors of Learnframe, and 
attempt to collect on that judgment as the Employees have done. Any such 
collection by Learnframe would be in second position to the IRS, which had 
already levied on all of Learnframe's assets. [COL If 13.] 
13 
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r. Even taking into account Mr. De Young's assessment of the value of 
Learnframe's assets, such a valuation would greatly exceed the value of APS5 s 
forbearance from suing Leamframe and attempting—lined up with all of 
Leamframe's other creditors—to collect on any judgment it may have received 
from Leamframe. [COL f 15.] 
The Purpose of the APS Agreement Was to Shield Learnframe's Assets from the 
Employees and Other Creditors 
s. Under the circumstances outlined above, the trial court found that 
the only reason that Leamframe would have transferred ownership of its assets to 
APS when APS had no perfected security interest in Learnframe's assets as a 
whole (but only a single uncollected receivable) was because Leamframe wanted 
to make a preferential transfer to APS that would shield Learnframe's assets from 
other creditors, including the Employees. [COL f 14.] 
t. Mr. DeYoung himself explained that in APS's view, the APS 
Agreement was to assist Leamframe in "pretending to be in business" so that APS 
could obtain venture capital financing. [FOF \ 28.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As an initial matter, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. APS was not a 
party to the proceedings below and failed to intervene, despite receiving notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. On this ground, the appeal should be dismissed. 
Second, APS raises statute of limitations for the first time, but raises the wrong 
statute. Even if APS had preserved this claim, the trial court's factual findings would 
have supported a ruling by the trial court that the Employees raised fraudulent transfer 
within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. 
Third, the trial court properly found sufficient clear and convincing evidence to 
undo, under a fraudulent transfer theory, Learnframe's attempted transfer of ownership of 
its assets to APS. APS has failed to marshal the evidence or otherwise properly challenge 
the trial court's findings. Thus, the Court can presume that the findings are supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
Fourth, the trial court provided sufficient due process to APS. Applicable law 
authorized the trial court, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, to undo 
Learnframe's fraudulent transfer and permit execution on Learnframe's assets. It would 
make no sense to force a judgment creditor to file a new fraudulent transfer lawsuit 
before executing on assets in the possession of the judgment debtor simply because the 
judgment debtor purports to transfer ownership of those assets to another creditor. 
The Court should affirm the trial court's rulings and award costs and attorney fees 




I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction because APS was not a party to the proceedings 
below. When faced with a similar issue, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by 
a third party to a supplemental order entered during the collection efforts of a judgment 
creditor. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, ]f 46, 110 
P.3d 678 ("Tremco I"). The Utah Supreme Court held in Tremco I: 
Although the Supplemental Order of July 10, 2002 provides that BYU's 
judgment against SoftSolutions may be enforced against assets of [third 
parties], none of those individuals or entities were parties to the district 
court proceedings. As nonparties, they cannot appeal the supplemental 
order. Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction 
and we must dismiss. 
Id. (citations omitted). In that case, the third parties were not named, and their motion to 
intervene had not yet been ruled on. See id. 
Likewise, APS never became a party to the district court proceedings. Although 
APS was provided the opportunity to appear and argue against the Writ of Execution, it 
never sought to intervene and was never named as a party. By failing to become a party, 
its appellate recourse was limited to bringing an extraordinary writ, see id at K 46 n.7, 
which it failed to do. Because APS is not a party to the proceedings below, this appeal 
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
II. EVEN IF APS HAD PROPERLY PRESERVED A STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT, NO STATUTE PRECLUDED THE 
UNDOING OF LEARNFRAME'S FRAUDULENT TRANSFER. 
The Court should reject APS's statute of limitations defense on two alternative 
bases. First, APS failed to preserve below any statute of limitations argument and is 
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barred from presenting the argument for the first time now. Second, even if the statute of 
limitations were properly before the Court, no applicable statute of limitations precluded 
the trial court from undoing Learnframe's transfer and authorizing the Employees to 
proceed with execution on assets in Learnframe's possession. 
A. APS Failed to Preserve the Statute of Limitations Issue Now 
Presented on Appeal. 
APS cannot raise statute of limitations now when it never gave the trial court the 
opportunity to consider it. See Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, f 30, 16 P.3d 1233; State 
v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6 (Utah 1993). An issue is preserved if—before the trial 
court—it is (1) "raised in a timely fashion"; (2) "specifically raised"; and (3) supported 
with "evidence or relevant legal authority." State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 6, 975 
P.2d 476 (citations omitted). "Mere mention" of an issue to the trial court, without 
supporting evidence or legal authority, is insufficient. LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel 
Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Here, the trial court provided to the parties "an adequate opportunity to speak to 
all the issues" [Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, R. 672, at 90:17-18, 152:21-24, 
163:23-25, 167:8-12]—and thus preserve arguments—through a hearing on any 
objections to the execution [R.491], time for briefing objections [R.378-414], a 
subsequent evidentiary hearing [R.502], an opportunity to propose findings of fact and 
conclusions of law [R.503-21], and finally leave to submit written objections to proposed 
findings and conclusions. After all this, APS now attempts to raise new arguments on 
appeal, without setting forth any ground for reviewing unpreserved issues. See Utah R. 
SLC 82657 
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App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) ("The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . a statement of grounds 
for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court."). Thus, the unpreserved 
statute of limitations argument is waived and should not be considered. 
B, Alternatively, APS's Statute of Limitations Argument Fails Because 
the Correct Statute of Limitations Had Not Yet Run. 
Even if APS had preserved its statute of limitations argument, the applicable 
statute of limitations had not yet expired when fraudulent transfer was raised by the 
Employees in seeking the Writ of Execution. Learnframe seeks to impose the one-year 
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10 (3) on the fraudulent transfer at issue 
here, but that statute only applies to a transfer to an insider under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-
6(2). See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10 (3) (2005) (providing one-year statute for fraudulent 
transfer claims "under Subsection 25-6-6(2)"). This statute was not at issue below. 
Rather, the trial court found that Learnframe's transfer of ownership of its assets was 
fraudulent under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1) and § 25-6-6(1), both of which are 
governed by a limitations period of at least four years. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10(1) 
(providing minimal four-year statute of limitations plus one-year discovery rule for 
transfers "under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a)"), kL § 25-6-10 (2) (providing four-year statute 
of limitations for transfers "under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1)"). 
2
 Paragraph 21 of the trial court's conclusions of law contains a typographical 
error: After quoting language from Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2), the paragraph 
mistakenly cites section 25-6-6(2), even though this provision governing transfers to 
insiders is never mentioned elsewhere in the findings or conclusions, or otherwise applied 
by the trial court. 
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Applying the four-year statutes of limitations that govern claims under sections 
25-6-5(1) and 25-6-6(1), without respect to the one-year discovery rule, the earliest that 
any limitations period would run for Leamframe's January 2003 transfer of ownership 
would be January 2007, which was well after the Employees first alleged Leamframe's 
fraudulent transfer to APS. [FOF f 2.] On this basis, APS's statute of limitations 
argument fails. 
III. BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S UNCHALLENGED FINDINGS, THE 
ELEMENTS OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ARE MET. 
The trial court found through clear and convincing evidence that Leamframe's 
attempt to convey to APS only ownership of its assets was fraudulent under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 25-6-5 (1) and 25-6-6(1). The trial court's determination is supported by 
numerous factual findings, which APS has failed to challenge properly on appeal. 
Applying the relevant fraudulent transfer statutes to the trial court's factual findings, 
APS's challenge should be rejected. 
A. Based on APS's Failure to Marshal All Factual Findings Are Taken as 
True. 
The Court should take as true all of the trial court's factual findings because APS 
has failed to marshal any evidence. An appellant's duty to marshal is no novel concept. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). Mere "citationf] to the 
record . . . is not all that is required." Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ^ 24, 973 P.2d 
431. Nor is it sufficient for an appellant to "re-argue" its own evidence. See id. Rather, 
the marshaling duty requires that "the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
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fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists," West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App, 1991), and show that the trial court's findings are "against the 
clear weight of the evidence," Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). 
This Court has warned litigants, "[w]hen a party fails to marshal the evidence 
supporting a challenged fact finding, we reject the challenge as nothing more than an 
attempt to reargue the case before [the appellate] court." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 
962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). When 
the appellant fails to meet its marshaling duty, relevant findings are taken as true. See 
Keil 2002 UT 32 at Tf 15; Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskev, 2001 UT App 44, ^ 10 n.5, 19 P.3d 
1005; Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at % 24; Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d at 230. 
APS does not marshal. It fails to provide any list of the evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. Indeed, APS fails even to identify or acknowledge the factual 
findings that it is challenging, instead simply rearguing the evidence from its point of 
view, and even incorrectly positing on multiple occasions that "[n]o such findings of fact 
were made." APS's Brief at 21, 22, 24. APS also argues on page 27 of its brief that the 
trial court failed to require clear and convincing evidence, even though the trial court 
expressly recognized this evidentiary standard. See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, R. 
672, at 153:21. In any event, due to APS's failure to marshal, APS cannot show that 
clear and convincing evidence was lacking. Based on APS's failure to challenge the trial 
court's findings in a proper fashion, the Court should presume that the trial court's 
findings are supported by sufficient evidence. See Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at f 24. 
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B. The Trial Court Properly Concluded That Learnframe's Transfer of 
Ownership Was Fraudulent Under Section 25-6-6(1). 
Considering the factual findings, the trial court properly held that a fraudulent 
transfer occurred pursuant to Section 25-6-6(1) when Learnframe purported to transfer 
ownership of its assets to APS in exchange for a forbearance of collection on 
Learnframe's debt to APS. The three elements of a fraudulent transfer under Section 25-
6-6(1) are that (1) the obligation to the complaining creditor must have arisen before the 
transfer was made; (2) the transfer was made without receiving a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange; and (3) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a 
result of the transfer or obligation. See Utah Code Ann. §25-6-6(1). The trial court's 
conclusion that a fraudulent transfer occurred under this section is supported by findings 
showing that all three elements were fulfilled. 
1. Learnframe's Obligation to the Employees Arose Prior to 
Learnframe Transferring Ownership of Its Assets to APS. 
The trial court found that Learnframe's obligation to the Employees arose before 
Learnframe transferred ownership of its assets to APS. [COL | 9.] Learnframe's 
obligation to the Employees arose not later than December 2002, when the Employees 
"brought this action for unpaid wages and benefits" [COL f 1], while Learnframe entered 
into the APS Agreement approximately one month later in January 2003 [COL f15]. 
Thus, Learnframe's obligation to the Employees arose before the ownership transfer. 
SLC 82657 
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2. Learnframe Did Not Receive Reasonably Equivalent Value for the 
Ownership Transfer to APS. 
Notwithstanding APS's claim that no findings related to reasonable equivalence, 
see APS's Brief at 24, multiple factual findings reflect the trial court's determination that 
the ownership interest that Learnframe transferred grossly exceeded the value of the 
forbearance Learnframe received from enforcement of APS's security interest in a single 
account receivable.3 [COLffll 11-13, 15.] 
3. Learnframe Was Insolvent at the Time of the Transfer of All of Its 
Assets to APS or Became Insolvent Shortly Thereafter. 
APS does not dispute that Learnframe was insolvent when it transferred ownership 
of its assets to APS. The Court's findings reflect this.4 [COL ffi[ 16-19.] Thus, all three 
elements of a fraudulent transfer under Section 25-6-6(1) were satisfied and the Court 
properly found Leamframe's asset ownership transfer to be fraudulent pursuant to that 
section. 
Based on the trial court's finding that the transfer of ownership was not for 
reasonably equivalent value, APS's reliance on section 25-6-9(1) is misplaced. See 
APS's Brief at 28-29. That provision is applicable only when "a person took in good 
faith and for a reasonably equivalent value." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(1). 
4
 Based on Leamframe's insolvency at the time it entered into the APS 
Agreement, APS's admission that it "had reasonable cause to believe" Learnframe was 
insolvent, APS's Brief at 20, and APS's inability to point to any evidence of its ignorance 
of Leamframe's insolvency, APS cannot avail itself of the good-faith transferee provision 
of section 25-6-9(4). See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(4) ("[A] transferee does not act in 
good faith when he has sufficient knowledge to place him on inquiry notice of the 
debtor's possible insolvency."); In re M & L Business Machine Co., 84 F.3d 1330, 1335-
36 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he presence of any circumstance placing the transferee on 
inquiry as to the financial condition of the transferor may be a contributing factor in 
depriving the former of any claim to good faith unless investigation actually disclosed no 
reason to suspect financial embarrassment."). 
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C. The Trial Court Properly Concluded That Learnframe's Transfer of 
Ownership Was Fraudulent Under Section 25-6-5(l)(a). 
The trial court also properly concluded, in light of the findings, that Learnframe's 
attempt to transfer ownership of its assets was done "with actual intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud any creditor of the debtor," as section 25-6-5(1 )(a) requires. [COL f^ 20.] 
"[Fraudulent intent. . . may be inferred from the presence of certain indicia of fraud or 
'badges of fraud,'" Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 UT App 373, f t 18, 20, 993 P.2d 887, 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2). 
The trial court considered the "badges of fraud"—namely those "various factors 
probative of actual intent, under Section 25-6-5(2)"—and concluded that "each of these 
factors is implicated here": 
Learnframe remained in possession and control of the property after the 
transfer. APS has never bothered to remove the assets from Learnframe's 
possession, as the APS Agreement permits, even though Learnframe has 
defaulted under the Agreement by not paying taxes, maintaining insurance, 
and remaining solvent. APS and Learnframe failed to disclose the transfer 
to creditors, including the IRS, which had already levied. Learnframe had 
been sued or threatened with suit before the transfer. The transfer was of 
all of Learnframe's assets. Finally, as detailed above in the analysis of 
section 25-6-6, Learnframe was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after 
the transfer was made. 
[COL TH| 21, 22.] In short, the trial court found, "the only credible reason for the APS 
Agreement was to shield Learnframe's assets from creditors, preferentially favoring 
APS." [COL 114, 21.] Since APS never properly challenges these findings, the Court 
should reject APS's argument that Learnframe's transfer was not for the purpose of 
"shielding assets." APS's Brief at 18. Based on its express findings, the trial court 
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properly concluded that the "APS Agreement effected a fraudulent transfer under Utah 
Code Ann. §25-6-5." Id 
D. APS's Other Fraudulent Transfer Arguments Fail. 
APS cites several additional provisions of Utah's fraudulent transfer statute, each 
of which is inapposite. First, APS relies on sections 25-6-9(2) and (3), suggesting that 
these provisions "would have prevented the ruling below." APS's Brief at 30. However, 
these sections only apply to situations where the judgment creditor seeks a money 
judgment against a fraudulent transferee. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(2) (limiting its 
application to actions brought under Section 25-6-8(1 )(a) "to recover judgment for the 
value of the asset transferred"). Here, the trial court has simply undone Learnframe's 
attempted transfer of ownership to APS, a remedy under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8(2)— 
not section 25-6-8(l)(a). Thus, these sections are inapplicable and the trial court was 
correct not to consider them. 
Second, APS suggests that it was entitled to some exception under Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-6-9(5), APS's Brief at 30, but for this statute to apply, the transfer had to come 
as a result of APS's "enforcement" of a security interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-
9(5)(b). APS's security interest was limited to one account receivable of Leamframe, 
and APS concedes that if it had "executed on its perfected security interest, that would 
have also killed Learnframe," so APS never executed. APS's Brief at 20. Since APS 
was not enforcing its security interest, section 25-6-9(5) does not apply. 
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Third, APS argues for Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(6)(c), but that section only 
governs transfers under section 25-6-6(2), which was not at issue here. See note 2, 
above. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SET ASIDE LEARNFRAME'S 
PURPORTED OWNERSHIP TRANSFER AND PROVIDED ADEQUATE 
DUE PROCESS TO APS. 
The trial court properly set aside Learnframe's purported ownership transfer 
without requiring the Employees, after obtaining the Judgment against Learnframe, to 
undertake the time and expense of bringing a separate suit against APS. Rule 64E does 
not require such a protracted procedure, instead authorizing execution on property in the 
possession of the judgment debtor. Nor does the Fraudulent Transfer Act require the 
filing of a new lawsuit; rather, it expressly allows execution on a fraudulently transferred 
asset, regardless even of who possesses the asset. Such procedures have been upheld in 
Utah and other jurisdictions. APS cannot mount a due process challenge because it 
received adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Under these circumstances, the 
trial court's rulings should be affirmed so that the Employees can proceed with their 
execution. 
A. Rule 64E Authorizes Execution on Assets in the Judgment Debtor's 
Possession. 
Utah's rules of civil procedure expressly allow the Employees to execute on 
property in the possession of Learnframe. Rule 64E provides: 
(a) Availability. A writ of execution is available to seize property in 
the possession or under the control of the defendant following entry of a 




Utah R. Civ. P. 64E(a). APS has entirely ignored this rule on which the Writ of 
Execution in this case is premised, and has failed to make any constitutional challenge to 
the rule. By following Rule 64E, the Employees ensured that APS had sufficient due 
process. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, If 28, 156 
P.3d 782 ("Tremco II") ("The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure owe their existence to the 
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. They '[are] designed to provide a pattern 
of regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon."') 
(quoting Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, P 13, 135 P.3d 861)). 
The Employees followed the requirements of Rule 64E in obtaining the Writ of 
Execution. As the trial court found, the property subject to the Writ of Execution is in the 
possession of Leamframe. See COL ^ 22 ("Learnframe remained in possession and 
control of the property after the transfer."). Moreover, the other procedural requirements 
of 64E were fulfilled: The writ included the amount of the judgment; the nature, location 
and estimated value of the property; and the name and address of APS as the only person 
known to the Employees that might have an interest in the Property. [R.273-76.] By 
following these procedures, APS received all the process due under the rules. 
The history of Rule 64E demonstrates that it has been narrowly tailored to ensure 
due process. Prior to 2004, Rule 69(s) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governed 
writs of execution. This former rule allowed a judgment creditor to execute on property 
"in the possession of the judgment debtor or any other person." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(s) 
(2003) (repealed) (emphasis added). The repeal of Rule 69 and enactment of Rule 64E— 
which limits execution to property in the possession of the judgment debtor, ensures 
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identification of anyone that may claim an interest in the property, and permits objections 
and hearings—demonstrates an intent of the drafters to provide more due process than 
was allowed under the former Rule 69. 
B. The Fraudulent Transfer Act Permits Execution on a Fraudulently 
Transferred Asset. 
Like Rule 64E, the Fraudulent Transfer Act expressly allows a judgment creditor 
to execute on assets fraudulently transferced by the judgment debtor: 
If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the 
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or 
its proceeds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8(2). APS completely ignores this statute in its brief, and fails to 
challenge its constitutionality. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] judgment creditor may litigate the 
question of a fraudulent conveyance in a garnishment proceedings, in a creditor's bill in 
equity, or in an execution proceeding/' without bringing suit against the third party. 
Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added). This Court has 
reached similar results. Applying Section 25-6-8(2), this Court has allowed a judgment 
creditor to execute on fraudulently transferred property without bringing suit against the 
third-party transferee, even when, unlike the instant case, the property was held by a the 
third party. See Johnson v. Rappleye, 2004 UT App 290, 99 P.3d 348. 
In Johnson, the judgment debtor transferred his half interest in real property to a 
third party who then sold the property and placed the proceeds in investment accounts in 
her name. Id. at f^ 9. When the judgment creditor discovered the transactions and moved 
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for a writ of execution on the third-party's investment accounts, the judgment debtor 
objected, claiming that he did not have an interest in the investment accounts. IdL at fflf 
11-12. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court held that the judgment debtor's 
transfer was fraudulent, and allowed the judgment creditor to execute on the investment 
accounts held in the name of the third party. Id. at If 12. This Court affirmed under Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-6-8(2), holding that the judgment creditor could execute on the 
investment accounts of the third party without filing suit against the third-party. Id at ff 
36, 44. 
The same result is appropriate here. Just as in Johnson, the trial court found that a 
fraudulent transfer occurred, see Point III, above, and allowed execution on the 
fraudulently conveyed assets. Unlike Johnson, the execution is further supported by Rule 
64E because the property has remained in Learnframe's possession. Just as in Johnson, 
this Court should affirm. 
APS's argument that the Employees should be forced to file a lawsuit against APS 
to undo the fraudulent ownership transfer defies common sense and the realities of 
commercial litigation. The purpose of the Fraudulent Transfer Act is to "codif[y] the 
common law that provided a remedy against debtors who sought to conceal their assets 
from creditors." National Loan Investors, L.P. v. Givens, 952 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Utah 
1998). APS's argument, if accepted, would permit a judgment debtor to conceal assets 
and postpone execution indefinitely, which is precisely what the Fraudulent Transfer Act 
is aimed at remedying. If the Employees were required to bring an action against APS 
before they could execute on assets in the possession of Learnframe, a judgment debtor 
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could forever stall a collection suit by simply making fraudulent transfers on the eve of 
execution, and forcing further protracted litigation with the transferee. At some point, the 
Employees need to be paid their wages and benefits, earned five years ago. APS's 
argument, which encourages judgment debtors to break the law, does not further sound 
policy and should be rejected. 
C. APS Has Failed to Mount a Sufficient Constitutional Challenge to the 
Trial Court's Execution Proceedings. 
APS's due process concerns should be rejected. APS received the due process 
protections inherent in Rule 64E and the Fraudulent Transfer Act, and completely fails to 
challenge the constitutionality of those provisions. Specifically, Learnframe received 
each of the "essentials of due process": "adequate notice and "an opportunity to be heard 
in a meaningful manner." Tremco II, 2007 UT 17 at f^ 28; see also Utah County v. Ivie, 
2006 UT 33, f 22, 137 P.3d 797 ("The hallmarks of due process are notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, but not all proceedings demand the same level of process."). 
Other jurisdictions, like this Court in Johnson and the Utah Supreme Court in 
Jensen, cited in Point IV(B), above, hold that due process can be provided to third parties 
through execution proceedings without naming them as parties in the underlying lawsuit. 
In Sackin v. Kesting, the Arizona Supreme Court overruled a challenge to a writ of 
execution by a third party transferee who argued that he was denied due process when the 
trial court allowed the judgment creditor to levy on the property fraudulently transferred. 
468 P.2d 925, 926 (Ariz. 1970). The court noted that the third party "was afforded his 
day in court . . . on his motion to quash the executions, at which time he had the right to 
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raise all legal and equitable defenses personal to himself that would justify their 
dissolution." Id.; see also Continental Bank v. Berman, 25 Phila. 80, 86-87, 1992 Phila 
City Rptr. LEXIS 122 (Pa. Phil Cty. 1992) (holding that fraudulent conveyance hearing 
"commenced in response to the debtor's petition to set aside execution" was adequate and 
the court "did not require the creditor to institute a separate fraudulent conveyance 
action") (discussing Patterson v. Hopkins, 371 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Super. 1977)); In re 
Miller, 148 B.R.510, 523 (Bankr. D. 111. 1992) ("[I]n cases where money or personal 
property of a debtor has been transferred by him for the purpose of defrauding creditors, 
the transferee may be held liable in a garnishment proceeding."). 
As in Sackin, the process provided to APS greatly exceeds the process given to the 
third parties in Tremco II where the Utah Supreme Court found due process lacking. In 
Tremco II, a judgment creditor sought to enforce a judgment against a dissolved 
corporation on the corporation's shareholders. See 2007 UT 17 at f^ 31. Before the 
shareholders could appear in the matter and defend against claims brought against them, 
the trial court found them liable for the corporation's debts. Id. at ffif 12, 22. Since these 
third-party shareholders did not participate and the judgment creditor's motion to impose 
on them the corporation's liability was unopposed, their liability was found "in an 
environment in which critical considerations—like burden of proof—were distorted to 
the advantage of [the judgment creditor]." Id. at f 35. The trial court in Tremco II 
allowed the judgment creditor to execute on all of the shareholder's assets, which were 
not in the possession of the judgment debtor. Id. at f|{ 11-12. The third-party 
shareholders, left with their liability already determined, could do nothing more than ask 
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the trial court to reconsider its previous rulings. The Supreme Court held in Tremco II 
that this procedure was insufficient due process. Id. 
This case is different. APS received the central features of due process—notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. APS was not just aware of the litigation around it, but 
was an active participant. APS was subpoenaed to participate in a deposition,5 [R.249-
55]; filed written objections to the constable's sale a Sheriffs Sale, [R.378-414]; attended 
oral argument on its objections, [R. 491]; participated in a full evidentiary hearing where 
the proper burden of proof was placed on the employees, [R.502]; submitted written 
objections to findings of fact and proposed findings of fact, [R.503-521]; and made 
objections to the Employees' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. By 
APS's own admission, "every point, and every argument asserted was addressed and 
contested." APS's Brief at 32. In short, APS was afforded its "day in court." See 
Sackin, 486 P.2d at 926. 
Unlike Tremco I j the trial court did not summarily impose liability on APS—it 
conducted two hearings where APS was allowed to appear, argue, and present evidence 
prior to the trial court undoing Leamframe's fraudulent transfer of ownership. Moreover, 
unlike Tremco II, where the trial court imposed liability on the third party for the full 
amount of the debt owed by the original judgment debtor and permitted execution on 
assets in the hands of third parties, the Employees have not sought to impose liability on 
5
 The trial court also received evidence, which was never controverted in filings by 




APS, but have only sought and obtained an order undoing Learnframe's fraudulent 
transfer of ownership of assets in Learnframe's possession. APS is not liable to the 
Employees and bears no responsibility for any deficiency in the Judgment once execution 
of Learnframe's assets is exhausted. Under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8(2) and Rule 64E 
and notwithstanding Tremco II, the trial court provided all the process due to APS. 
Moreover, the due process concerns raised in Tremco IL are not implicated here 
because Tremco II was decided under the now-repealed Rule 69(s) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which as addressed in Point IV(A), above, has been replaced with the 
narrowly tailored Rule 64E, followed in this case. 
APS's final due process argument is mere speculation that the trial court "had 
already made a determination of some, or all of the issues related to APS, before APS 
was even in the case." APS's Brief at 25. APS's only authority for this view is the 
transcript for the February 2006 hearing, which does not suggest any preconceived 
determination by the district court. See id. at 25 n.7. Moreover, APS's position is belied 
by the fact that the trial court, before making any ruling at the February 2006 hearing as 
to any facts, permitted APS to present live witness testimony and other evidence at a foil 
evidentiary hearing, scheduled with several months' advance notice. Then, before any 
facts were found, the trial court permitted APS to propose findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, which APS took advantage of, and then submit objections to the 
Employees' proposed findings. 
SLC 82657 
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Based on the notice and opportunity to be heard afforded to APS and the fact that 
the execution at issue relates solely to assets that remain in Learnframe's possession, 
APS's due process argument fails. 
V. THE EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED 
ON APPEAL. 
The Employees should be awarded the attorney fees they incur in connection with 
this appeal. Under Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1 (2005), "whenever a[n] . . . employee shall 
have cause to bring suit for wages earned and due . .. and shall establish by the decision 
of the court that the amount he has brought suit for is justly due, then it shall be the duty 
of the court to allow the plaintiff a reasonable attorneys5 fee in addition to the amount 
found due for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit." The Judgment is premised on this 
statute. By prevailing on appeal, the Employees should be awarded the attorney fees and 
costs incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Employees respectfully request that this Court affirm 
the trial court's Order entered on August 30, 2006, award to the Employees their 
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15, 2007 (FEDERAL CASES). *** 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§25-6-1. Short title 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fiaudulent Transfei Act." 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 25A-1-1, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 59, § 1; recompiled as C. 1953,25-6-1. 
§ 25-6-2. Definitions 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, othei than a person who holds the securities: 
(l) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or 
(n) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or moie of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, con-
trolled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with 
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding votmg securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securi-
ties: 
(I) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the secunties; or 
(n) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, oi a person substantially 
all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of 
the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankmptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to piocess by a creditoi 
holding a claim against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Qeditoi" means a peison who has a claim 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim 
(6) "Debtoi" means a peison who is liable on a claim 
(7) "Insidei" includes 
(a) if the debtoi is an individual 
(l) a relative of the debtoi oi of a geneial paitnei of the debtor, 
(n) a paitnei ship m which the debtoi is a geneial partnei, 
(m) a geneial paitnei in a partnei ship descubed in Subsection (7)(a)(n), 
(IV) a corpoiation of which the debtoi is a director, officei, or peison in control, oi 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtoi is a membei oi managei, 
(b) if the debtoi is a corporation 
(l) a dnector of the debtor, 
(n) an officei of the debtoi, 
(in) a peison in contiol of the debtoi, 
(iv) a paitnei ship in which the debtoi is a geneial partner, 
(v) a geneial paitnei in a partnei ship descubed in Subsection (7)(b)(iv), 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager, or 
(vn) a lelative of a general partner, director, officei, oi peison in contiol of the debtor, 
(c) if the debtoi is a paitnei ship 
(l) a geneial paitnei m the debtoi, 
(n) a lelative of a geneial paitnei in, a general partner of, or a person m contiol of the debtor, 
(in) anothei partnership in which the debtoi is a geneial paitner, 
(iv) a geneial paitner in a partnership descubed in Subsection (7)(c)(m), 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member oi manager, or 
(vi) a peison in contiol of the debtor, 
(d) if the debtoi is a limited liability company 
(I) a membei oi managei of the debtor, 
(n) anothei limited liability company in which the debtoi is a membei oi managei, 
(in) a paitnei ship in which the debtoi is a geneial paitner, 
(iv) a geneial paitnei in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(d)(ni), 
(v) a peison in control of the debtor, or 
(vi) a lelative of a geneial partnei, membei, manager, or person in control of the debtor, 
(e) an affiliate, oi an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate weie the debtoi, and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtoi 
(8) "Lien" means a chaige against oi an mteiest in pioperty to secure payment of a debt or peifomiance of an ob-
ligation, and includes a secuiity mteiest cieated by agieement, a judicial hen obtained by legal oi equitable piocess oi 
pioceedmgs, a common-law hen, or a statutory hen 
(9) "Peison" means an individual, paitnership, limited liability company, corpoiation, association, organization, 
government 01 governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any othei legal 01 commeicial entity 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, lelated by consanguinity withm the thud 
degiee as detei mined by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive lelationship within the 
thud degiee 
(12) "Tiansfei" means eveiy mode, direct oi mdnect, absolute or conditional, or voluntaiy oi involuntary, of dis-
posing of oi parting with an asset oi an interest m an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and cieation 
of a hen oi other encumbrance 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holdei of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal 
oi equitable piocess or pioceedmgs 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-2, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 2, lecompiled as C 1953, 25-6-2, 1992, ch 168, § 1 
§ 25-6-3. Insolvency 
(1) A debtoi is insolvent if the sum of the debtoi's debts is gieatei than all of the debtoi's assets at a fair valuation 
(2) A debtoi who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is piesumed to be insolvent 
(3) A paitneiship is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the paitnei ship's debts is greatei than the aggie-
gate, at a fan valuation, of all of the paitneiship's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each general partnei's 
nonpaitneiship assets over the paitnei's nonpartneishrp debts 
(4) Assets under this section do not include piopeity that has been tiansferred, concealed, or removed with intent to 
hindei, delay, oi defraud cieditois oi that has been tiansferred in a manner making the tiansfer voidable under this chap-
tei 
(5) Debts undei this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on pioperty of the 
debtor not included as an asset 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-3, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 3, recompiled as C 1953,25-6-3 
§ 25-6-4. Value — Transfer 
(1) Value is given foi a tiansfei oi an obligation if, in exchange foi the tiansfei oi obligation, property is tiansfened oi 
an antecedent debt is seemed oi satisfied Howevei, value does not include an unpeifoimed piormse made othei than m 
the oidinaiy course of the piomisoi's business to furnish suppoit to the debtor oi anothei peison 
(2) Undei Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a peison gives a leasonably equivalent value if the peison 
acqunes an mteiest of the debtoi in an asset pursuant to a legulaily conducted, noncollusive foieclosuie sale oi execu-
tion of a powei of sale for the acquisition oi disposition of the mteiest of the debtor upon default undei a moitgage, deed 
of ti ust, oi secunty agieement 
(3) A tiansfei is made foi piesent value if the exchange between the debtoi and the tiansfeiee is intended by them 
to be contempoianeous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 4, lecompiled as C 1953, 25-6-4 
§ 25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer 
(1) A tiansfei made 01 obligation mcuned by a debtoi is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the cieditor's claim aiose 
befoie 01 aftei the tiansfei was made oi the obligation was mcuned, if the debtoi made the transfer oi incurred the obli-
gation 
(a) with actual intent to hindei, delay, oi defraud any cieditoi of the debtoi, or 
(b) without leceiving a leasonably equivalent value in exchange foi the transfer or obligation, and the debtoi 
(l) was engaged oi was about to engage in a business oi a transaction for which the remaining assets of the 
debtoi weie umeasonably small in lelation to the business oi tiansaction, or 
(n) intended to mcui, oi believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his abil-
ity to pay as they became due 
(2) 1 o deteimme "actual intent" undei Subsection (l)(a), consideration may be given, among othei factois, to 
whethei 
(a) the tiansfei oi obligation was to an insider, 
(b) the debtoi letained possession oi contiol of the piopeity tiansfened after the tiansfer, 
(c) the tiansfei oi obligation was disclosed oi concealed, 
(d) befoie the tiansfer was made oi obligation was mcuned, the debtoi had been sued or thieatened with suit, 
(e) the tiansfei was of substantially all the debtor's assets, 
(f) the debtoi absconded, 
(g) the debtoi lemoved oi concealed assets, 
(h) the value of the consideiation received by the debtoi was leasonably equivalent to the value of the asset tians-
fened or the amount of the obligation mcuned, 
(l) the debtoi was insolvent oi became insolvent shoitly aftei the tiansfei was made or the obligation was m-
cuned, 
(j) the tiansfei occuned shoitly befoie or shoitly aftei a substantial debt was mcuned, and 
(k) the debtoi transfened the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of 
the debtor 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 5, lecompiled as C 1953,25-6-5 
§ 25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before transfer 
(1) A tiansfei made or obligation mcuned by a debtoi is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim aiose befoie the trans-
fei was made oi the obligation was mcuned if 
(a) the debtor made the tiansfei or mcuned the obligation without leceiving a leasonably equivalent value in ex-
change foi the transfei oi obligation, and 
(b) the debtoi was insolvent at the time oi became insolvent as a result of the tiansfei or obligation 
(2) A tiansfei made by a debtoi is fiaudulent as to a cieditoi whose claim aiose befoie the tiansfer was made if the 
tiansfei was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had leason-
able cause to believe that the debtoi was insolvent 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-6, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 6, lecompiled as C 1953, 25-6-6, L 1989, ch 61, § 1 
§ 25-6-7. Transfer - When made 
In this chaptei 
(1) A tiansfei is made 
(a) with lespect to an asset that is leal propeity other than a fixture, but including the mteiest of a sellei or pui-
chasei undei a contiact for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so fai perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the 
asset fiom the debtoi against whom applicable law peimits the tiansfer to be peifected cannot acquire an mteiest m the 
asset that is supeiioi to the mteiest of the tiansfeiee, and 
(b) with lespect to an asset that is not leal propeity 01 that is a fixture, when the tiansfei is so fai peifected that a 
cieditor on a simple contiact cannot acqune a judicial hen other than undei this chapter that is supeiioi to the mteiest of 
the tiansfeiee 
(2) If applicable law peimits the tiansfer to be peifected as piovided in Subsection (1) and the tiansfer is not so 
peifected befoie the commencement of an action foi lehef undei this chapter, the transfer is deemed made immediately 
befoie the commencement of the action 
(3) If applicable law does not peimit the tiansfei to be perfected as piovided in Subsection (1), the tiansfer is 
made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee 
(4) A tiansfei is not made until the debtoi has acquned lights in the asset tiansfened 
(5) An obligation is inclined 
(a) if oial, when it becomes effective between the parties, oi 
(b) if evidenced by a wilting, when the wilting executed by the obligor is delivered to oi foi the benefit of the 
obligee 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-7, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 7, lecompiled as C 1953, 25-6-7 
§ 25-6-8. Remedies of creditors 
(1) In an action for relief against a tiansfei or obligation under this chaptei, a creditor, subject to the limitations m 
Section 25-6-9, may obtain 
(a) avoidance of the tiansfei or obligation to the extent necessaiy to satisfy the cieditor's claim, 
(b) an attachment oi othei piovisional lemedy against the asset transfened oi othei pioperty of the tiansfeiee in 
accoidance with the proceduie piescnbed by the Utah Rules of Civil Proceduie, 
(c) subject to applicable pimciples of equity and in accoidance with applicable rules of civil proceduie 
(I) an injunction against fuither disposition by the debtor or a transfeiee, oi both, of the asset transfened oi of 
othei piopeity, 
(II) appointment of a receivei to take chaige of the asset tiansfened oi of other propeity of the tiansfeiee, oi 
(in) any othei lehef the cncumstances may lequire 
(2) If a cieditoi has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtoi, the cieditoi, if the court ordeis, may levy 
execution on the asset tiansfened oi its pioceeds 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-8, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 8, lecompiled as C 1953, 25-6-8 
§ 25-6-9. Good faith transfer 
(1) A tiansfei 01 obligation is not voidable undei Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a) against a person who took in good faith and 
for a leasonably equivalent value oi against any subsequent transferee or obligee 
(2) Except as otheiwise provided in this section, to the extent a tiansfer is voidable m an action by a cieditoi undei 
Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the cieditoi may lecover judgment foi the value of the asset transfeired, as adjusted undei Sub-
section (3), oi the amount necessary to satisfy the cieditoi's claim, whichever is less The judgment may be enteied 
against 
(a) the fust tiansferee of the asset or the person foi whose benefit the transfer was made, oi 
(b) any subsequent transfeiee othei than a good faith transfeiee who took for value or from any subsequent tians-
fei ee 
(3) If the judgment undei Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset transfened, the judgment must be for 
an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfei, subject to an adjustment as equities may lequire 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a tiansfei oi an obligation undei this chapter, a good-faith transfeiee or obligee 
is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor foi the tiansfei or obligation, to 
(a) a hen on oi a light to letam any inteiest m the asset tiansferred, 
(b) enfoi cement of any obligation incurred, or 
(c) a leduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment 
(5) A transfei is not voidable undei Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) oi Section 25-6-6 if the tiansfei results fiom 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtoi when the teimmation is puisuant to the lease and applicable 
law, oi 
(b) enfoicement of a secunty inteiest in compliance with Title 70A, Chaptei 9a, Unifoim Commeicial Code — 
Seemed Tiansactions 
(6) A tiansfei is not voidable undei Subsection 25-6-6(2) 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to oi foi the benefit of the debtoi aftei the transfei was made unless 
the new value was seemed by a valid lien, 
(b) if made in the oidmaiy course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider, or 
(c) if made puisuant to a good-faith effort to lehabihtate the debtoi and the tiansfer secured piesent value given 
foi that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtoi 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-9, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 9, lecompiled as C 1953, 25-6-9, 2000, ch 252, § 2 
§ 25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits 
A claim foi lehef 01 cause of action legarding a fiaudulent tiansfer or obligation undei this chapter is extinguished 
unless action is brought 
(1) undei Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), within four yeais aftei the tiansfer was made or the obligation was incurred oi, 
if latei, within one year aftei the transfei oi obligation was oi could leasonably have been discoveied by the claimant, 
(2) undei Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b) or 25-6-6(1), withm foui years after the transfei was made oi the obligation 
was incuired, oi 
(3) undei Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one yeai aftei the tiansfei was made oi the obligation was mcuned 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-10, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 10, lecompiled as C 1953,25-6-10 
§ 25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter 
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including merchant law and the law lelatmg to pim-
cipal and agent, equitable suboidmation, estoppel, laches, fraud, misiepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insol-
vency, oi othei validating oi invalidating cause, supplement this chapter's provisions 
HISTORY:C 1953, 25A-1-11, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 11, lecompiledas C 1953,25-6-11 
§ 25-6-12. Construction of chapter 
This chaptei shall be applied and constiiied to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to 
the subject of this chapter among states enacting it 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-12, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 12, lecompiled as C 1953,25-6-12 
§ 25-6-13. Applicability oi chapter 
This act applies when any tiansfei occurs aftei the effective date of this act 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25A-1-13, enacted by L 1988, ch 59, § 13, lecompiled as C 1953, 25-6-13 
§ 25-6-14. Restricting transfers of trust interests 
(1) (a) Foi trusts cieated on or aftei Decembei 31, 2003, a settlor who m writing irrevocably transfeis piopeity in trust 
to a tiust having as tmstee a company defined in Subsection 7-5-l(l)(d) who holds some or all of the trust assets m this 
state in a savings account descnbed in Subsection 7-1-103(29), a ceitificate of deposit, a brokeiage account, a trust 
company fiduciary account, oi account oi deposit located m this state that is similai to such an account may piovide that 
the income oi principal interest of the settloi as beneficial y of the trust may not be eithei voluntarily or mvoluntanly 
tiansfened befoie payment oi dehveiy to the settloi as beneficiary by the trustee The provision shall be consideied to 
be a lestnction on the tiansfei of the settloi's beneficial mteiest m the trust that is enfoiceable undei applicable non-
bankruptcy law within the meaning of Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankiuptcy Code or successor piovision 
(b) This Subsection (1) applies to 
(I) any foim of transfer into trust including 
(A) conveyance, or 
(B) assignment, and 
(n) transfeis of 
(A) peisonal propeity, 
(B) mteiests in peisonal propeity, 
(C) leal propeity, or 
(D) mteiests in leal piopeity 
(2) (a) Except as piovided in Subsection (2)(c), if a trust has a lestnction as piovided m Subsection (l)(a), a creditoi 
oi othei claimant of the settloi may not satisfy a claim, oi liability on it, m eithei law oi equity, out of the settloi's tians-
fei oi settloi's beneficial inteiest in the trust 
(b) Foi the purposes of Subsection (2)(a), a creditoi includes one holding oi seeking to enfoice a judgment en-
teied by a couit oi othei body having adjudicative authonty as well as one with a right to payment, whether oi not le-
duced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equita-
ble, secured, or unsecuied 
(c) A lestnction piovided undei Subsection (1) does not pi event a ci editor oi peison descnbed in Subsection 
(2)(a) fiom satisfying a claim oi liability out of the settloi's beneficial inteiest in oi tiansfer into trust if 
(I) the claim is a judgment, oidei, deciee, oi othei legally enforceable decision or ruling lesultmg fiom a judi-
cial, aibitiation, mediation, oi admimstiative pioceedmg commenced pnoi to oi within three yeais aftei the trust is cre-
ated, 
(n) the settloi's tiansfei into trust is made with actual intent to hinder, delay, oi defraud that cieditoi, 
(m) the trust piovides that the settloi may l evoke oi terminate all oi part of the trust without the consent of a 
peison who has a substantial beneficial mteiest in the tiust and the mteiest would be adveisely affected by the exeicise 
of the settlor's powei to levoke oi terminate all oi pait of the trust, 
(IV) the tiust lequnes that all oi a pait of the tiust's income oi ptincipal, oi both must be distiibuted to the settloi 
as beneficiary, 
(v) the claim is foi a payment owed by a settloi undei a child suppoit judgment oi ordei, 
(vi) the tiansfer is made when the settloi is msolvent oi the tiansfer renders the settloi insolvent, 
(vn) the claim is foi lecovery of public assistance leceived by the settloi allowed undei Title 26, Chaptei 19, 
Medical Benefits Recoveiy Act, 
(vin) the claim is a tax oi othei amount owed by the settloi to any governmental entity, 
(ix) the claim is by a spouse 01 former spouse of the settloi on account of an agieement 01 older foi the payment 
of suppoit 01 alimony 01 foi a division 01 distiibution of piopeity, 
(x) (A) the settlor tiansferred assets into the trust that 
(I) weie listed in a wiitten lepiesentation of the settloi's assets given to a claimant to induce the claimant to 
entei into a transaction 01 agieement with the settloi, or 
(II) were transfened fiom the settloi's contiol in bleach of any wiitten agreement, covenant, 01 security m-
teiest between the settlor and the claimant, 01 
(B) without limiting the claimant's light to puisue assets not held by the trust, a claimant desciibed m Subsec-
tion (2)(c)(x)(A) may only foieclose 01 execute upon an asset m the trust listed m the wiitten representation desciibed m 
Subsection (2)(c)(x)(A)(I) 01 tiansfei led m bieach of a wiitten agreement, covenant, 01 security mteiest as piovided in 
Subsection (2)(c)(x)(A)(II) to the extent of the settloi's mteiest m that asset when it was transfened to the trust or the 
equivalent value of that asset at the time of foieclosuie 01 execution if the onginal asset was sold 01 tiaded by the trust, 
01 
(xi) the claim is a judgment, award, oidei, sentence, fine, penalty, or othei deteimmation of liability of the 
settlor foi conduct of the settloi constituting fiaud, intentional infliction of harm, 01 a cnme 
(d) The statute of limitations foi actions to satisfy a claim or liability out of the settloi's beneficial mterest m 01 
tiansfei into tiust undei Subsections (2)(c)(n), (v), (vn), (vm), (ix), (x), and (xi) is the statute of limitations applicable to 
the underlying action 
(e) For the purposes of Subsection (2)(c) "levoke 01 terminate" does not include 
(1) a power to veto a distiibution fiom the tiust, 
(n) a testamentaiy special powei of appointment 01 similai power, 
(m) the light to receive a distiibution of income, pnncipal, 01 both m the discretion of another, including a trus-
tee othei than the settloi, an mteiest in a charitable lemamdei unitrust or charitable remainder annuity trust as defined in 
Internal Revenue Code Section 664 oi successoi piovision, or a light to leceive principal subject to an ascertainable 
standaid set foith in the trust, oi 
(IV) the powei to appoint nonsubordinate adviseis or trust piotectois who can remove and appoint trustees, who 
can dnect, consent to oi disappiove distnbutions, oi is the power to serve as an investment directoi oi appoint an in-
vestment duectoi undei Section 75-7-906 
(3) The satisfaction of a claim undei Subsection (2)(c) is limited to that pait of the trust oi transfei to which it ap-
plies 
(4) (a) If a trust has a lestriction as piovided undei Subsection (1), the lestnction pievents anyone, including a pei-
son listed in Subsection (2)(a), fiom asseiting any cause of action oi claim foi lelief against a trustee or anyone involved 
m the counseling, drafting, piepaiation, execution, oi funding of the trust foi 
(I) conspnacy to commit a fiaudulent conveyance, 
(n) aiding and abetting a fiaudulent conveyance, oi 
(m) participating in the trust hansaction 
(b) A pei son pi evented fiom asseiting a cause of action oi claim for relief undei this Subsection (4) may assert a 
cause of action only against 
(l) the tiust assets, oi 
(n) the settloi or beneficiaiy to the extent allowed under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a) 
(5) In any action brought undei Subsection (2)(c), the buiden to piove the matter by clear and convincing evidence 
shall be upon the ci editor 
(6) Foi purposes of this section, the transfei shall be considered to have been made on the date the piopeity was 
originally transferred in trust 
(7) The couits of this state shall have exclusive jurisdiction ovei any action bi ought under this section 
(8) If a trust or a pioperty transfei to a trust is voided or set aside under Subsection (2)(c), the trust or pioperty 
transfer shall be voided 01 set aside only to the extent necessary to satisfy 
(a) the settlor's debt to the creditoi 01 other peison at whose instance the trust or propeity transfer is voided 01 set 
aside, and 
(b) the costs and attorney fees allowed by the couit 
(9) If a trust oi a pioperty tiansfei to a trust is voided oi set aside undei Subsection (2)(c) and the court is satisfied 
that the trustee did not act m bad faith in accepting oi admimsteiing the property that is the subject of the trust 
(a) the trustee has a fust and paramount hen against the property that is the subject of the trust m an amount equal 
to the entne cost piopeily mcuired by the trustee in a defense of the action or proceedings to void oi set aside the trust 
or the piopeity transfei, including attorney fees, 
(b) the trust oi piopeity tiansfei that is voided oi set aside is subject to the piopei fees, costs, pieexistmg lights, 
claims, and inteiest of the tiustee and any piedecessoi trustee if the tiustee and piedecessoi tiustee did not act in bad 
faith, and 
(c) any beneficialy, including the settloi, may letam a distiibution made by exeicismg a trust power or discietion 
vested in the tiustee of the trust, if the power or discietion was piopeily exeicised befoie the commencement of the ac-
tion oi pioceedmg to void oi set aside the trust oi pioperty transfer 
(10) If at least one trustee is a trust company as defined in Subsection 7-5-1 (l)(d), then individuals may also seive 
as cotrustees 
HISTORY: C 1953, 25-6-14, enacted by L 2003, ch 301, § 2, 2003 (2nd S S ), ch 3, § 1, 2004, ch 8Q, § 4 
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Page 1 
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
Copyiight (c) 2007 by Matthew Bendei & Company, Inc 
a membei of the LexisNexis Gioup 
All Rights Reserved 
STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VIII PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Rule 64E. Writ of execution. 
(a) Availability A wnt of execution is available to seize piopeity in the possession 01 undei the contiol of the defen-
dant following entry of a final judgment 01 ordei lequnmg the dehveiy of pioperty 01 the payment of money 
(b) Application To obtain a wnt of execution, the plaintiff shall file an application stating 
(1) the amount of the judgment oi oidei and the amount due on the judgment oi oidei, 
(2) the natuie, location and estimated value of the propeity, and 
(3) the name and addiess of any peison blown to the plaintiff to claim an mteiest in the pioperty 
(c) Death of plaintiff If the plaintiff dies, a wnt of execution may be issued upon the affidavit of an authorized ex-
ecutoi oi admimstiatoi oi successoi in mteiest 
(d) Reply to wnt, lequest for heanng 
(1) The defendant may leply to the wnt and lequest a heanng The leply shall be filed and seived withm 10 days af-
tei seivice of the wnt and accompanying papeis upon the defendant 
(2) The couit shall set the mattei foi an evidentiaiy hearing If the court determines that the writ was wiongfully ob-
tained, oi that pioperty is exempt fiom seizuie, the couit shall entei an oidei directing the officei to lelease the piopeity 
If the couit deteimines that the writ was pioperly issued and the propeity is not exempt, the couit shall entei an oidei 
directing the officei to sell oi delivei the propeity If the date of sale has passed, notice of the rescheduled sale shall be 
given No sale may be held until the court has decided upon the issues piesented at the hearing 
(3) If a leply is not filed, the officei shall pioceed to sell or deliver the pioperty 
(e) Mortgage Foieclosuie governed by statute Utah Code Title 78, Chaptei 37, Mortgage Foieclosuie, governs 
mortgage foieclosuie pioceedmgs notwithstanding contiaiy piovisions of these rules 
HISTORY: Repealed and leenacted effective Novembei 1, 2004 
TabC 
David E.Hardy (1367) 
Hardy & Allen 
818 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-6600 
Facsimile: (801) 364-6664 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
,KIRT ASHTON, CLAIR BENNETT, 
3RADLEY MITCHELL, TODD NIELSEN, 
BRIAN PRATT, and PAUL RADVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEARNFRAME, INC., MICHAEL . 
MEMMOTT, SR., RALPH MASON, 
GARY TOBIAN, and LEE PRICE 
Defendants. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020414271 
Judge: Lindberg 
The Court having reviewed Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and finding 
good cause appearing therefore, enters Default Judgment as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment be entered against 
Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. On Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action (Violation of Utah Code § 34-28-5, non-payment 
of accrued wages) judgment against Defendant Learnframe in favor of Plaintiffs Ashton, 
Bennett, Mitchell, Nielsen, Pratt and Radvin in the amounts of $11,699^22, $13,56^34, 
$29,952.49, $10,540.23, $4,009.00 and $13,449.60, respectively. 
„ JJ&02&2 
2. On Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action (Breach of Contract), judgment against 
Defendant Learnframe in favor of Plaintiffs Ashton, Bennett, Mitchell, Nielsen, Pratt and Radvin 
in the amounts of $13,356.44, $13,717.20, $29,952.49, $10,540.23, $8,446.50 and $14,249.60, 
respectively. 
3. On Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action (Fraud - 401K Plan and 125K Plan Payroll 
Deducitons), judgment against Defendants Learnframe, Memmott, Mason, Tobian, and Price, 
both jointly and severally, in favor of Plaintiffs Ashton, Bennett, Pratt and Radvin the amounts of 
$900.00, $151.86, $1,312.50 and $800, respectively. 
V v" V v 
4. On Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action (Wrongful Conversion - 40 IK Plan and 
125K Plan Payroll Deductions), judgment against Defendants Learnframe, Memmott, Mason, 
Tobian, and Price, both jointly and severally, in favor of Plaintiffs Ashton, Bennett, Pratt and 
Radvin the amounts of $900.00, $151.86, $1,312.50 and $800, respectively, 
v v/ V
 v ' 
5. For an award against Defendant Learnframe and in favor of Plaintiffs of the 
amount of $6,700 representing Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred herein as 
provided for under Utah Code § 34-27-1 pertaining to actions seeking to recover earned but 
unpaid wages, as supported by the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees filed herewith. 
6. For interest to accrue on each of the foregoing from and after the date of judgment 
at the rate established for judgments, until paid in full. 
2 
000283 
DONE AND ORDERED this ' ^ day of l(mA , 2003. 
-'1 
// 
l t / s• -/ 
enise P. Lindberg 




Because Learnframe, Inc.(Learnfranie) a Delaware Corporation, located at 12637 South 
265 West Draper, Utah has been unable to repay its debt TO American Pension 
Services(APS), located at 11027 South State Street Sandy, Utah, the parties agree as 
follows: 
Learnframe hereby transfers all of irs rights title and interest in all of its personal properry • *^ J' 
to APS.See attached list of personal property.- This shal l a l so include ba t not be ^ 
l imi ted t o a l l of Learnframe r igh t s in software i£ has developed as w e l l y 
as a l l names, copyr ights , pa ten t s , and contract r i g h t s . 
Learnframe shall have the right tor three years from this date to purchase back from APS 
all personal property transferred in this agreement once the total debt with interest is 
repaid for One Dollar. 
Learnframe will be allowed to continue to use the equipment for the above referenced 
three-year period under the following conditions: 
1 .Learnframe will be responsible to pay all personal property taxes(for this purpose 
Learnframe will be allowed to carry' the equipment on its books). 
2.Learnframe will be responsible to pay all personal property insurance and to name 
APS as a coinsured party. 
2.Learnframe will maintain all equipment to assure that it is in good working order. 
APS shall have the right to inspect its personal property during normal business hours by 
giving Learnframe a one-hour notice. 
If Learnframe files for Bankruptcy , becomes insolvent, or the control of the company 
changes, meaning the existing CEO is replaced, then in that event APS shall have the 
right to take immediate possession of ail its Personal Property. 
Wear and tear due to use in the normal course of business is acknowledged and 
approved. 
There is an existing IRS Lien that may take president to the APS ownership position. 
Learnframe will notify APS at least annually of any substantial change in the personal 
property due to missing, discarded, or inoperable property. 
If APS sells any or all of the Personal Property due to a default by Learnframe, the 
balance owing to APS will be reduced by the amount of money received from the sale. 
The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this agreement. 
urr. fi„s*s±JP$t76M <?cf/S SLOOf 000292 
S.learnfrsrne" 
T H E F R A M E W O R K O F e - L E A R N I N G 
February 18,2004 
Mr. Curtis DeYoung 
American Pension Services 
11027 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Dear Mr. DeYoung, 




Michael D. Memmott 
CEO, Learnframe, Inc. 
000293 
801.523.8000 • 800.738.9800 • 12637 South 265 West, Draper, UT 84020 • www.learnframe.com 
c n t n t n c n t n c n t n t n c n t n c n c n t n i n e n e n t A c n i n t n u i e n t n c n t ^ i n i n i n t n a i c n o i t n i n t n e n c n e n c n i n t ^ 
C B c n t / i m c n c n J i j ^ e ^ u i w h J W K J ^ ^ i o t o ^ ^ ^ ^ o i e n o i o i e n e n e ^ c n e n t n i n e j i 
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686 Adobe Illustrator 9 0 Software 
686 Adobe Photshop 6 0 Software 
688 HP LaserJet Printer 
702 Developer Desktop Computer 
703 Pentium III 650 
707 Crystal Reports 
722 ODBC Express Software 
729 Web Board 4 0 
730 Asta Unlimited Lie (electronic license) 
748 Plli 600 128 MB 20 5 GB 
753 Furniture for build out 
766 2 Microsoft Windows 2000 
774 600MhzPui256mb17" 
775 600 Mhz Pin 256mb 17" 
779 Mahogany desk 
780 Mahogany desk 
788 Dual Developer Com 
797 Dual Developer Com 
798 Developer Test Computer 
840 Dual Developer P3 600 mhz 
854 HON106S46-NN-30x66 Mahogany desk 
858 MSDN Universal Subscnption-Provantage 
859 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
868 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
ti73 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
873 Upgrade Competitive Jbuiider/4 0 ProLevel A License 
874 Adobe Illustrator 9 0 Software 
874 Adobe Photshop 6 0 Software 
878 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
879 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
880 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
881 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
882 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
883 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
884 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
884 128 MB Ram 
884 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
884 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
912 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
913 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
914 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
914 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
915 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
916 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
920 Standard Desktop Computer 
920 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
928 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
936 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
948 Task Chair 
973 Task Chair 
1026 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
1026 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
1034 Developer Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
1034 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
1035 Developer Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
1035 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A License 
1036 Fujitsu Laptop Model E-6570 
1060 (1) NT-FL GDPro Win-NT Floating Network License 




























































R & D 
R&D 
R & D 
R&D 
R&D 
R & D 
R&D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R&D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D (Server Room) 
R & D 
R&D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
Nebo 
Quality 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
Quality-Inventory 6/7/0 
Q A 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R&D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
Class 
GL Expense 




























































1 Justin Fllley 
1 Justin Fllley 
1 System Admin 
1 Robert Moultrie 
1 Garrett Pease 
1 Evan Eastley 
1 Alan Brown 
1 Alan Brown 
1 Lon Clark 
1 Marc Chrusch 
1 R & D 
1 Curt Kahelele 
1 Curt Kanahele/Robert Cardon 
1 Tyler Wilcox 
1 Randy Bliss 
1 Curt Kanahela 
1 Bret Landon 
1 Jamie Mascherino 
1 Paul Ahn 
1 Mark Keele 
1 Justin Fllley 
1 Alan Brown 
1 Jerry Hayward 
1 Tyler Wilcox 
1 Nathan Bayles 
1 Nathan Bayles 
1 Todd Manookin 
1 Todd Manookin 
1 Michael Youngstrom 
1 Evan Eastley-On loan to Ford 
1 Chad Eiztnga 
1 Bradford Williams 
1 Prabhakar Knshnaswami 
1 Chris Preece 
1 Dan Glade 
1 Dan Glade 
1 Dan Glade 
1 Dan Glade 
1 AiexJuchelka 
1 Curt Kanahele 
1 Bnan Cauley 
1 Bnan Cauley 
1 Deepa Matta 
1 Al Wild 
1 Inventory 
1 Nicias Gothberg 
1 Jens Steadman 
1 Chris Bryant 
1 Mike Youngstrom 
1 Bradford Williams/Mitchell 
1 Calvin Smith 
1 Calvin Smith 
1 Phil Clark 
1 Phil Clark 
1 Lance Heaton 
1 Lance Heaton 
1 Lori Clark 
1 Lon Clark 



















































































































































































































































Tag# Description Stale Location 
1063 Delphi 5 Professional UT 
1063 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4.0 ProLevel A License UT 
1074 2 user concurrent ER/Studio - Upgrading ER/Studlo License UT 
1083 Developer Workstation UT 
1091 Installshield Professional 2000 Upgrade UT 
1092 (7) MS Source Safe V6.0 Win Comp Single UT 
1103 (3) Microsoft Visual Source Upgrade UT 
1104 (2) Microsoft Visio 2000 UT 
1111 MSDN Universal Subscription UT 
1124 Borland Jbuiider Professional V4.0 UT 
1125 Borland Jbuiider Professional V4.0 UT 
1127 Borland Delphi 5 Professional UT 
1158 Task Chair UT 
1160 Task Chair UT 
1161 Task Chair UT 
1162 Task Chair UT 
1163 Task Chair UT 
1164 Task Chair UT 
1165 Task Chair UT 
1167 Delphi 5 Professional UT 
1167 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4.0 ProLevel A License UT 
1168 Developer Workstation UT 
1168 Delphi 5 Professional UT 
1168 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4.0 ProLevel A License UT 
1169 Developer Workstation UT 
1170 Delphi 5 Enterprise UT 
1170 Delphi 5 Professional UT 
1170 Upgrade Competitive Jbuilder/4.0 ProLevel A License UT 
1171 Developer Workstation UT 
1172 Developer Workstation UT 
1174 (15) Visual Cafe Enterprise License UT 
1193 Install anywhere enterprise edition software UT 
1220 Toed Developer-xpert edition e store pack UT 
1222 18 Task lights - HON70930 UT 
1227 Laptop C600, 1GHz, Pentium III TX 
1229 Memory upgrades for Nebo developers UT 
488(a) RAM and Harddrive for Asset # 488 UT 
SW001 MKS Source Integrity 2, 5-user lie UT 
SW002 Robohelp UT 
SW0Q3 Framernaker 5.5 Software UT 

























































External CD Recorder Sony 
Pentium 111 450 Desktop Computer 
Dual Processor test Machine 
Dual Processor test Machine 
Dual Processor test Machine 
Dual Processor test Machine 
500 MHz Pet III 128 MB 17" Monitor 



























































































































1 Chris Sapp 
1 Chris Sapp 
1 Alan Brown 
1 Alan LeBaron 
1 Garrett Pease 
1 Curt Kanahele 
1 Curtis Kanahele 
1 Alan Brown 
1 Curtis Kanahele 
1 Brian Pratt 
1 Alan LeBaron 
1 Chris Sapp 
1 T im Schrelbar 
1 Joshua Miner 
1 Van Phill ips 
1 T im Stewart 
1 unass lgned 
1 Alan LeBaron 
1 unasslgned 
1 Daniel Spot ten 
1 Daniel Spot ten 
1 Logan Al lred 
1 Logan Al lred 
1 Logan Al lred 
1 Mark Ne lson 
1 Nlclas Gothberg 
1 Niclas Gothberg 
1 Niclas Gothberg 
1 Fred Doddr idge 
1 Timothy Schreiber 
1 Alan Brown 
1 Lori Clark 
1 Jerry Hayward 
1 Lori Clark 
1 Randy Bliss 
1 Alan Brown 
1 Dan Glade 
1 Alan Brown(dev) 
1 Alan Brown(dev) 
1 P e a s e ( d e v ) 



























































































































































































































































































































































R & D 
R & D 
Quality 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
Implementation 




















R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
QA 
Q A 





R&D (Brad Mitchell) 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 



































































600 Mru Pi l l 15" Monitor 
600MhzPII I 15" Monitor 
600 Mhx P 111 1 5" Monitor 
600 MhzP III 15" Monitor 
600 Mru: PHI 15" Monitor 
450 MHz Pet III 64 MB 17 Monitor 
Pill 600 128 MB 20 5 GB 
Pill 600 256 MB 20 5 GB 




Compaq Storage Rack 
Compaq Storage Rack 




J Test for Windows NT 
30*66 Mahogany desk 
Task chair 
Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
MSDN Universal Subscrtption-Provantage 
(MSDN Universal Subscrlption-Provantage) 
MSDN Universal Subscnption-Provantage 
MSDN Universal Subscription-Provantage 
MSDN Universal Subscnption -Provantage 
Delphi 5 Professional 
J Test License for Windows NT 
J Test License for Windows NT 
Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
3-User Oracle Standard Edition License 
2-User Oracle Standard Edition License 
Rational Visual Test 






V-Test for Windows NT 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
Rational Visual Test 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
J Tes t -Win NT 
Rational Visual Test 
Rational Visual Test 
Rational Visual Test 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
30x66 Mahogany Desk9 w/pedestal 
15-Oracle Database Standard Edition Licenses 
(3) Rational Visual Test 
5-Oracle Database Standard Edition w/2 cd pks 
36x60 Mahogany Desk (dbl pedestal) 





























































































































































































































































































2/19/200411 04 AM 
Asset 






























J Test -Win NT 
Rational Visual Test 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
Rational Visual Test 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
Standard Workstation - Hewitt Rand 
3120-09396 Rational Visual Test 
3120-09396 Rational Visual Test 
Cisco 2912 12 Port Switch 
Dual Processor Rock Mount 
Dual Processor Rock Mount 
Dual Processor Rock Mount 
Dual Processor Rock Mount 
Developer Workstation 
3121-09395 Rational Load!est Base License 
30/66 Mahogany Desk w/pedestel 





























































600 Mhz Pill 15" Monitor 
Task Chair 







R & D 





AX-720 Autoloader Diskette Duplicator 




Warehouse - Draper 
363 Laptop computer - Compaq Presario 




693 Mahogany Desk 
694 Mahogany Bookshelf 
695 Mahogany Desk 
696 Mahogany Bookshelf 
701 Mahogany Bookshelf 
709 600 Mhz Pill 256mb 17" 
724 Pill 600 128 MB 20.5 GB 
755 Web Server For Arrowhead 
853 30x66 Mahogany Desk 
867 Task Chair 
871 TR200B 3672 Mahogany Desk/Articulating Keyboard 
885 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
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Mike Memmott Jr 
Ron Sanders 
Scott Wheelhouse 







Troy Wilde/Scott Wheelhouse 
Mike Memmott Jr 






















































































































































































































•WIQ/OIWM 1 f M AM 
Asset 










Developer Workstat ion-Hewit t Rand 




Dell Power APP W e b 100 
Task Chair 
Standard Workstat ion - Hewitt R a n d 
Casio - E 1 1 5 Pocket PC 



































































Used Flatbed Scanner a n d sof tware 
Laptop computer - C o m p a q Presario 
Upgrade Competit ive Jbuiider/4.0 ProLevel A License 
Intel Celron 366 6 4 m b R a m 
Pill 256 mb Desktop computer 
400 mhz 32 mb Desktop Computer 
Winbook X I2 
Pent ium 111 4 5 0 mhz 
Project 2000 
Polycom speaker phone w/satel l i te mics 
Clearcom 12 Button Phone 
(2) Harris HDLU2 Card 
Harris Signal Scan Unit 
Harris Time Switch Unit 
Switch 
Chair 
600 Mhz P i l l 15" Monitor 
600 Mhz P i l l 15" Moni tor 
450 MHz Pet III 64 M B 17 Moni tor 





Labor on Firewall 
2) 24 port Cisco routers 
Rack mounts power Tap 
Racks for server r o o m / Fire wail 
SG 3.0 EnKit 
Cisco Switches 
Novel Netware 5.0 Lie (5 User) 
2- Cisco Switches 
2- cat2924 Switches (Cisco) 
Harris HDLU2 Card 
Pill 600 256 MB 20.5 G B 
Cabinets 
Cisco 2620 Router 
F5-Big IP -
Freight for Asset 768-F5-B ig IP 
F5-Big IP -
Cisco Pix Firewall 520 
Cisco Pix 520 Chassis a n d Software Prep 
Cisco Catalyst 3500 Swi tch 
Cisco Catalyst 3500 Swi tch 
LAN Wire System (Cable) 















































Shane 's Off ice 





Implementa t ion 
Inventory 
Implementa t ions 
New lobby conference r o o m q 
Implementa t ions 
Server R o o m 
Server R o o m 
Server R o o m 
Implementa t ion 
Implementat ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementat ion (Lab) 
Implementa t ion 
2 n d Floor - Middle 
R & D 
R & D 
R & D 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Implementa t ion 
Inventory 
Implementa t ion 









Implementa t ion 
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GL Expense 































Mike Memmott Jr 






Mike Memmott Sr 









































































































































































































J im Hall 
Shane Reed 
M a r c W e l k e r 
System A d m i n 
Blair T h o m a s 
Blair T h o m a s 
Blair T h o m a s 
implementat ion 
System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
System Admin 
Shane R e e d 
System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
Inventory 
System A d m i n 
Shane Reed 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
System A d m i n 













12 /21 /2000 
12 /21 /2000 
11/17/1999 
1/11/2000 
2 /25 /2000 
2 /25 /2000 
3 /1 /2000 
2/24/2Q0Q 
4 /1 /2000 
4 /17 /2000 
4 /15 /2000 
5 /15/2000 
1/6/2000 







4 /1 /2000 
3 /7 /2000 
3 /31 /2000 
2 /29 /2000 
6/8 /2000 
6/1572000 
7 /7 /2000 
6 /15 /2000 
6 /7 /2000 
6 /7 /2000 
6 /7 /2000 
6 /7 /2000 
4 /14 /2000 
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Developer Workstat ion 
(6) License Library for Microsoft 
Microsoft License Library 
(10) Powerware 300VA UPS - PW3115-300 
(2) Netware5-25 User License 
10 Rack mountable power dist unit 
(14) Network Surgearrest Rackmoun laces 
(14) Network Surgearrest Rackmountaccs 
(14) Network Surgearrest Rackmountaccs 
(14) Network Surgearrest Rackmountaccs 
Cisco 2924 X L Switch 
Cisco 2924 X L Switch 
Cisco 2924 X L Switch 
Cisco 2924 X L Switch 
(10) H a m s Clear C o m 12 Button Phones 
(25) MSDN Universal Subscr ipt ion 
Appl icat ion Manager Media Kit 
(2) Netware 5 0 Addit ive L icense 
(2) Netware 5 0 Addit ive License 
Cubicles (50% deposit) 
Workstat ions 
(3) Microsoft Project 2000 
(10) Power 3115 Work Stat ion UPS 
Dell Power Vault 7 0 0 N , 300 G B of s torage 
Dell Power Vault 7 2 0 N , Network Access Server 
Cisco 3600 Router 
(2) Netware 25-user l icense 
Cisco 2S00XL 24 Port Swi tch 
Compaq 128 MB S D R A M 
Blinds for Nebo Area 
Rockmount Monitor 
24 Port Switch-Cisco 2924XL 
24 Port Switch-Cisco 2924XL 
(10) Workstat ion U P S 
Laptop and. a&cessortes-
Upgrade Competit ive Jbuilder/4 0 ProLevel A L icense 
Laptop a n d accessar ies 
Materials for electric work 
Rackmount 
Router Network Card 
Webboard for w m d o w s / M S D E )SQL Server 
Tape Back up 
Tape Back-up 
Fujitsu E-6595 
Gateway 600 m h z ram s w a p 
Dell 600 mhz DVD 
Cisco Pix Four Port 10/100 
Computer Repair 
Intraware equipment 









































































Server R o o m 
Server R o o m 
Server R o o m 


















Server R o o m 












G & A 








































































































4 5 a 






































































J im Hall 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Data Center 
Shane R e e d 
Shane R e e d 
Diostnbuted to 10 employees 
Shane Reed 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Shane R e e d 
Shane R e e d 
Shane R e e d 
Shane Reed 
Troy Baxter 
Shane R e e d 
Jason Forbush 
Shane R e e d 
Shane R e e d 
Shane Reed 
Shane Reed 
Shane R e e d 
Shane R e e d 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Shane R e e d 
Shane Reed 
J im Hall 
Shane Reed 
Gary Y o u n g 
Shane Reed 
Shane R e e d 
Shane R e e d 
Blair Tftwnas 
Blair T h o m a s 
Bfajr T h o m a s 
Shane R e e d 
Shane R e e d 
Gary Y o u n g 
Gary Y o u n g 
Shane Reed 
Shane R e e d 
unass igned 
J im Hall 
J im Hail 
Implementa t ion 
J i m Hail 
J i m Hall 





































































































































3 2 , 7 3 2 1 3 
1 8 , 1 1 0 3 4 
2,749 15 
2,749 15 
45 ,000 00 
43 ,580 51 
1,285 61 
1,169 85 
21 ,766 15 



















































































S 799,827 70 
Asset 
Tag # Description Slate Location 
361 Proxima DP5800 Projector 
392 Booth 
412 Laptop computer - Winbook XLI PII266 
412 Winbook XL2 laptop computer Pll 333 
41S Ufebook B112 Pll -233 Fujitsu notebook computer 
495 (3) Bookcases 
501 External CO player for laptop computer 
598 Furniture In Training Room 
621 Chair, recliner 
683 450 MHz Pet III 64 MB 17 Monitor 
740 Windows CE Handheld 
786 Printer 
789 Computer equipment 
790 Computer equipment 
827 Trade Show Booth 
827 OCU Services/Trade show booth 
827 Back Wall-trade show booth 
827 Learnframe sign for 10x10 Booth 
827 Canopy of conference/Trade show booth 
827 Podium for Trade show booth 
827 Trade Show Booth 
827 Trade Show Booth 
850 30x60 Mahogany Desk 
851 30*66 Mahogany Desk 
852 Mahogany Bookcase 
866 30*66 Mahogany Desk 
895 Developer Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
899 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
901 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
933 Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
1014 Task Chair 
1090 NEC Monitor 
1159 Task Chair 
1189 Adobe Photshop 6.0 Software 
1190 Adobe Illustrator 9.0 Software 





























































































Laptop computer - Lifebook Fujitsu 
Canon laser printer 
Laptop Computer-Compaq Presario 
HP Printer/Fax/Co pier/scanner S600 
HP Office Jet Model 500 
Winbook XL K62300 laptop computer 
Winbook XL K62300 laptop computer 
Printer. Brother MFC7150C 
DeskJet Printer 
Gold Mine 4.0 Standard 10-users 
HRCD Rom 































Sales - Georgia 
Sales - Illinois 
Sales - Georgia 
Sales - Texas 
Sales - Georgia 
Maybe in storage? 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































« 3 1 
Description 
PV20 Connect Uc 
H/P Printer / Toner /Cable 
Hewitt Rand -Fujitser Laptop 
Fujitsen Laptop 
Fujitsen Laptop 
30*66 Mahogany Desk 
Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
FUiftSU £4&$Q 
-ftijterii E-€5"66 
82" High Divider Panels (4) 
Fujitsu Laptop 5670 




Dell Pentium II 
Laptop L40Q-> TOO; MH2, *>Hi 
Laptop t400v 700- MHz> Ful 
Dell Lexmark Optra E312L 
L40Q, 7DQ--MHZ, WU U&top 
uoo<?adttH*>flftUfto0 








































S a l e s 






































Laptop Computer-Compaq Presario 1215 
Iomega Zip Drive 
desk, chair 
Pentium 11400 mhz 
Mahagony desk 
HP Office Jet 
HP LaserJet 1100 Printer 
HP LaserJet 1100 Printer 









600 Mhz Pili 256mb 17" 
Mahogany desk 
Mahogany desk 
Furniture for new entry, conference tables,etc 
Furniture for new entry, conference tables,etc 
Standard Desktop Computer 
Aspen Sofa and pillows 
Aspen Chair 
Rug 
Standard Workstation-Hewitt Rand 
Fujitsu E-6556 
Fujitsu E-6556 
Xii 128 MB SD Ram Module 
3 user business work license 
Mahogany Desk 13672 
Fire proof 4 drawer file cabinet 











































G & A 
G & A 
G & A 
G & A 
Human Resources 
G & A 
G & A 
G & A 
Human Resources 
G & A 
G & A 
G & A 
G & A 
G&A 
G & A 
G&A 
G & A 


















































































Preston Bar ton 
Tamara McNatt 
Mite Kelteter 




Ralph M a s o n 
M & e S t J t t a p 
Joan Fraser-Sante 
)Ja*rice M&riano 
Janice Z e n a n a 
Ron Lackey 
Gabtg>-©ttfdei...... 































3 202 83 



























































































































Gary Tob lan 
Jenni fer J o h a n s o n 
Jeff Sansing 
Marcie B u s h 
Lori Sess ions 
Joanne P o w e r 
Marcie B u s h 
Recept ionist 
Misty Pend le ton 
Jeff Sans ing 




Shari iyn A n d e r s o n 








Marcie B u s h 
Bret Reich 
Gary Tob lan 
Gary T o b l a n 
Steve Rider 
Bret Re ich 
Bret Re ich 
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Software (MS Office) 
On-Line UPS 
Alarm System for Addition 
Electrical work on build out 
Seagate Software (Crystal Reports) 
Windows 2000 Server w/5 Cals 
Sony 8 cassette backup Seagate 
SQL Server 7.0 (5 client) (P-2-n56614 
15-Harris Clear Com 12 Button Phones 
Installation of Alarm System 
Installation of Alarm System 
Tables and Trees 
Picture for Large Conference Room/H-417294 
Panel to wall mount kit (2) 
Panel to wall mount kit (2) 
(7) SQL Server Open License 
(2) SQL Server per proc licenses 
(50) SQL CAL (user license) 
(150) WinZip Std Edition License 






























Hall ( C o m p a q Rock) 
Implementat ion 
New Area /Whse 
New A r e a / W h s e 
Front Entry W a y 
Large Conf room 
Conf R o o m # 1 







1191 Leasehold-Architectural fees/permit fees/profit UT 
LH 005 Leasehold improvements to Draper building UT 
LH 005 Leasehold Improvements to Draper building UT 
LH 006 Sound Wall (Draper) UT 
LH001 Leasehold Improvements UT 
LH003 Remodel of mezzanine, warehouse area to office space UT 
LH004 Floors by Design, Remodel south expansion UT 
LH-1089 Remodel of New Area UT 
New building 
Draper Office Building 
Draper Office Building 
Draper office building 
Sales, R&D 
Draper office bldg 


























Laptop computer - Winbook XL P233 
Laptop computer-Winbook XL P233 
Laptop computer - Winbook XLI PII266 
Laptop CQrtpirtef -"WtribooK JKLI P\l2&& 
Laptop computer +"Wfahoo1< XL 
Lafitop computer +>tf fafcoofc XL 
Wfoboe*. XL Amrf # 6 1AQQ 
Wlttb fcok. Xt Afcml fc6 S 4QQ 
Winbook XL Amd K6 2 400 
Winbook XL AmdK6 2 400 
Wmhaok xi2 
W3nfa6ok*l2 
Winbook XI AMD K6-200 
Winbook XI AMD K6-20Q 
Winbook XL K62400 





Winbook XL T12-1 P233 
Winbook XL T12-1 P233 
Winbook XL T12-1 P233 

























Sold to Linton-$20O 0Q 
Sold to Llntoo-$20G 00 






S o ( d t o E a s t l e y - $ 2 1 0 00 
Sold to East!ey-$210.00 
sMa4J3Q702-
W/6-4/30/02: 
Sold to Bergeson-$225 00 
Sold to Bergeson-$225 00 
Sold to Spotten-5180 00 





Sold to Todd Memmott-S190 
Sold to Todd Memmott -$190 
Solf to 0 rockbank-$175 00 
Solf to Brockbank-$175 00 
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4 5 0 
450 



































System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
System A d m i n 
Shane Reed 
System A d m i n 
Jason Forbush 






Paul A h n 



















































































































































































































































1,777 43 3 
(1,777.43) 








Tag# Description State Location Class PP Class 
4&; 
GL Expense 


















 'WtofettkXlS .s \ -
Wlnbook 
Wlnbook 














Less Leasehold Improvements 
Cost of Pers Prop per Learnframe 
Cost per SL Co Pers Prop Report 






Ending Balance 12/31/00 
TabE 
Jeffrey M.Jones (1741) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500 
David E.Hardy (1367) 
HARDY & ALLEN 
818 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)364-6600 
Facsimile: (801)364-6664 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Wt&T CTORDAkJ DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KIRT ASHTON, CLAIR BENNETT, 
BRADLEY MITCHELL, TODD NIELSEN, 
BRIAN PRATT, and PAUL RADVN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEARNFRAME, INC., MICHAEL 
MEMMOTT, SR., RALPH MASON, GARY 
TOBIAN, and LEE PRICE, 
Defendants. 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Case No. 020414271 
Judge Lindberg 
rmtx'j '> 1 
WHEREAS, Judgment was entered against defendant Learnframe, Inc. ("Learnframe") in 
the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on March 27, 2003, for the principal 
amount of $96,962.46, plus interest thereon at the rate of 3.41% per annum from the date of 
Judgment until paid. The current balance of the Judgment is $101,447.46, and bears interest in 
the per diem amount of $8.76. 
THEREFORE, you are commanded to collect the aforesaid Judgment, together with the 
costs of this execution, and levy on and sell enough of Leamframe's personal property to satisfy 
the same, and this shall be your sufficient warrant for so doing. Please return this writ within 
sixty (60) days with your doings in the premises hereon endorsed. 
WITNESS MY HAND with the seal of this Court affixed at my office in Salt Lake City, 
Utah on the Z"]& day of C{L(M 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
2 
TabF 
Jeffrey M. Jones (1741) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500 
David E.Hardy (1367) 
HARDY & ALLEN 
818 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-6600 
Facsimile: (801) 364-6664 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST - . . .S 'AKI •-.-• • •• i 
KIRT ASHTON, CLAIR BENNETT, 
BRADLEY MITCHELL, TODD NIELSEN '% I \ \ •' -S Or I \Cl AND 
BRIAN PRATT, and PAUL RADVTN, , v ^ s ^ L S i G N b OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, 
CaseiNo. UJU4WJ/I 
Judge RoyalX Hansen 
LEARNFRAME, INC., MICHAEL 
MEMMOTT, SR., RALPH MASON, GARY 
TOBIAN, and LEE PRICE, 
Defendants. 
*-U: 
•V-ii * • i ' 
000526 
This matter came before the Honorable Royal J. Hansen for oral argument and 
evidentiary hearing on October 27, 2005, February 27, 2006, and June 30, 2006, pursuant to 
objections made by defendant Learnframe, Inc. ("Learnframe"), and by two nonparties, American 
Pension Services, Inc. ("APS"), and Steve Patrick ("Patrick"), to the Writ of Execution issued by 
the Court on July 27, 2005, and the Constable's Sale scheduled pursuant to the Writ of 
Execution. Erik A. Olson appeared for plaintiffs. Denver Snuffer appeared for Learnframe. 
Timothy Miguel Willardson appeared for APS. Hollis S. Hunt appeared for Patrick. Based on 
the evidence and arguments of counsel and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Procedural Background 
1. Plaintiffs Kirt Ashton, Clair Bennett, Bradley Mitchell, Todd Nielsen, Brian Pratt, 
and Paul Radvin are former employees of Learnframe. In December 2002, plaintiffs brought this 
action against Learnframe for unpaid wages and benefits, and received a Judgment against 
Learnframe on March 25, 2003. Leamframe has failed to satisfy the Judgment. 
2. On July 27, 2005, plaintiffs applied for, and the Court issued, a Writ of Execution 
against all personal property in the possession of Leamframe. [Writ of Execution.] 
3. On July 29, 2005, a Salt Lake County Constable served the Writ of Execution and 
Notice of Constable's Sale on Learnframe, scheduling the sale for August 18, 2005. [Order 
Overruling Leamframe's Objections to Writ of Execution and Sheriffs Sale at 2.] 
2 
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4 Leamframe served an opposition to t:^ •-- n. o< ^ . ^ - _ , c : v< ^i^us; . :•. _;.)05, 
•AW.1 r^n-jpsted a liearing on September 15, 2005. [Order Overruling Leamframe's Objections to 
Writ of Execution and Sheriffs Sale at 2.] 
5. T'l" .' :x! a hear::^ or Oc:-k i r 2"" ?- !': ^n I •v.-rir1 rr:i»-r:f"-; objections 
to the Writ of Execution. Leamframe failed to appear at the hearing. Later that day, plaintiffs 
served Leamframe with an Order overruling Leamframe's objections s ..^ . ;. . LXCU..U>;: and 
sale, I earnfran w failed to object to the proposed Order, which the Court proceeded to enter on 
January 13,2006. 
6. A . * -!:SL. v. >, i^ ai-v ,-wis scheduled for February 7, 2006. 
7. APS, Patrick, and Leamframe filed objections to the Constable's Sale. 
8. Plaintiffs, Leamframe, APS, and Patrick appeared at oral argument on February 
27, 2006. After • ••-:»•' •••-<-imv * • V- Ccw: -rheduled an evidentiary hearing on June 30, 2006, and 
directed plaintiffs to serve notice of the evidentiary hearing on Leamframe, APS, and Patrick, as 
well as the Internal Revenue Service rlRS^j a;u: an; ^ri 'eaed scared ,.:-^;.u^ i_r: rarnframe, 
[Order Regarding Evidentiary Hearing on Objections to Writ of Execution and Sheriffs Sale.] 
9. Plaintiffs served notice of the evidentiary hearing on Leamframe, APS, Patrick, 
anclhvi.RS. TV-:-
 :r ±o *~r\ • ' .„^; «•--r,- MP! ; • -:- ;i!!-~-eed perfected secured creditor of 
Leamframe. [Certificate of Service of Order Regarding Evidentiary Hearing on Objections to 
Writ of Execution and Shenll s Sale.] 
3 
UvJO.SZS' 
10. At the evidentiary hearing on June 30, 2006, only plaintiffs, Learnframe, APS, 
and Patrick appeared. Neither the IRS nor MPI Corp. appeared, and neither filed an objection to 
the Writ of Execution. 
APS's Default in Payments to Creditors 
11. In or about October 2001, APS loaned approximately $1,500,000 to Learnframe. 
APS received from Leamframe and filed with the Utah Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code (the "Division") a UCC-1 financing statement that perfected a security interest 
in a certain receivable from Learn University in the amount of $1,500,000. [Def. Ex. 8.] 
12. Not long thereafter, APS stopped paying its creditors as bills became due. Among 
others, Learnframe failed to make payments to APS, plaintiffs, and the IRS. 
13. On or about November 11, 2002, the IRS gave notice to Learnframe of a federal 
tax lien in the total amount of $1,767,040.68. [Def. Ex. 4.] 
14. Learnframe reported to the IRS a $6,882,037 net loss for the tax year ending 
December 31, 2002. Learnframe also reported on its tax return that the total value of its accounts 
receivable, inventory, buildings, equipment, intangibles, and other assets was $3,376,316. [PI. 
Ex. 14.] 
The APS Agreement 
15. On or about January 8, 2003, Learnframe entered into an agreement with APS (the 
"APS Agreement") under which Learnframe agreed to transfer "all of its rights[,] title and 
interest in all of its personal property to APS." A list of transferred assets was attached to the 
APS Agreement, but the APS Agreement also specified that "[t]his shall also include but not be 
4 
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limited to all of Leamframe['s] rights in software it has developed as \\c:. as .m names, 
copyrights, patents, and contract rights." [PL Ex. 6.] 
16. The APS Agreement permitted Leamframe to purchase back from APS for one 
u •..,'.. »• ••>: ;:K > -pc".- : JP — :":*e;i .;• ^i;": ir:er repayment v-r! "!•-^"me's debt This option to 
repurchase its property expired three years after the date of the APS Agreement, on January 8, 
2006. [PL Ex. 6.] 
17 I ,earnframe maintained the right under the APS Agreement to continue to use the 
property it transferred to APS only under three express conditions: that Leamframe (1) pay all 
properi) inxcb, u y pay all insurance premiums, ami' i i» maintain nli equipment in good working 
order. From the outset, Leamframe failed to satisfy these conditions. [PL Ex. 6; Curtis 
DeYoung; Michael Memmott] 
18. AP9 !-.:i< 1 (he 1'ii'Jil undent?-? APC: Agreement to take immediate possession of the 
assets transferred to APS in the event that Leamframe became insolvent. [PL Ex. 6.] 
19. Notwithstanding the provisions o: me .-vrs ^gruu^i j , , .-.: > u:> idnuu u take 
possession from Leamframe of the property transferred under the APS Agreement. [Michael 
Memmott.] 
Findings Regarding the \ alue of Learnframe's Assets 
20. The Court finds, based on Leamframe's own admission in its 2002 tax returns, 
that the value of Leamframe's assets as of December. . _ > _. . „^IK ua^: ,;jLu»t un; Mining of 
the APS Agreement, was approximately $3,376,316. [PL Ex. 14.] 
5 
0uuL>3C 
21. Learnframe has failed to present any credible evidence to refute the year-end-2002 
valuation of its property that it admittedly reported to the IRS. 
22. For two primary reasons, Defendant's Exhibit 12—a February 20, 2006, tax 
assessment from the Salt Lake County Assessor—does not establish the value of Learnframe's 
property as of the end of 2002: 
a. First, this document is effective as of January 1, 2006, exactly three years 
and a day after the effective date of the valuation set forth on Learnframe's tax returns. 
[Def. Ex. 12.] 
b. Second, Learnframe's President, Michael Memmott, was unable to lay 
foundation for any of the figures set forth on the document. He did not know what 
"SHRT LIFE, "EQP SHRTL," or other abbreviations meant. He admitted that he had no 
knowledge of whether the document included Learnframe's intellectual property, 
copyrights, and computer software. Lee Price, Learnframe's CFO, is the only one, 
according to Mr. Memmott, who would have this knowledge. 
Additional Findings Regarding Elements of Fraudulent Transfer 
23. Through the APS Agreement, APS obtained title to all of Learnframe's personal 
property, including equipment, accounts receivable, inventoiy, copyrights, software, intellectual 
property. [Michael Memmott.] 
24. Learnframe entered into the APS Agreement because Learnframe was not paying 
the debt that Learnframe owed to APS. [Michael Memmott.] 
6 
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25. At the time it entered into the APS Agreement, Leamframe was not paying its 
debis n> *'M \^ IV-'-M;-;;1 .-*•;., The sum of Leaiiiframe's debts far exceeded the value of its assets. 
Leamframe was undergoing severe financial difficulties at the time, having been sued or 
threatened v\ « • - . .* • M^IS. ^ : ' ^ : ; V!-JT.:' | 
26. Through the APS Agreement, Leamframe retained possession and control of the 
property transferred, and continued to do so even when it breached conditions oi me j\r$ 
Agreement. [Michael Meniniott,] 
27. Leamframe never circulated the APS Agreement to its other creditors. The APS 
Agreement was not IKL\: \\m •;. i * ^ ;M. ;. •» •* ^..\* -* ;vporteii mi a ui I I Tiled with ilie 
Division. The APS Agreement was not supplied to the IRS. [Michael Memmott] 
28. Curtis DeYoung, APS's principal, indicated that the APS Agreement was 
intended to assist Leamframe in "pret'-n-*inv u V '-• ^-iness" so that APS could obtain venture 
capital financing. [Curtis DeYoung.] 
Additional Findings Regarding Creditors 
29. Patrick is an unperfected, unsecured creditor of Leamframe. While Patrick has a 
judgment against Leamframe, Patrick has never levied on the judgment. 
30. T'-n-^-^,. r-, ' }r rv--c— -\; i.-n -- -)r:i: .. *>L>-: * -.-; secured creditor other than 
the IRS, which failed to appear at the hearing, and APS, which has a perfected, secured interest 
in the $l,M<w,, • - Learn University receivable only. 
7 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Issuance of the Writ of Execution 
1. Plaintiffs' application for a Writ of Execution satisfied the requirements of Rule 
64E. [Order Overruling Learnframe's Objections to Writ of Execution and Sheriffs Sale at 2.] 
2. By failing to make a timely request for hearing in accordance with Rule 64E, 
failing to appear at the hearing on October 27, 2005, and failing to submit a timely objection in 
accordance with Rule 7 to the Court's January 13, 2006, Order during the two-and-a-half-month 
period before the Court entered it, Learnframe has waived any objections to the Writ of 
Execution and the Constable's Sale. [Order Overruling Learnframe's Objections to Writ of 
Execution and Sheriffs Sale at 2.] 
3. Moreover, even considering Learnframe's objections to the Writ of Execution on 
the merits, Learnframe has still failed to present sufficient evidence to support its objection to the 
Writ of Execution. Patrick and APS have also failed to present a sufficient evidentiary basis for 
objecting to the Writ of Execution. 
Unsecured Creditors, Including Patrick, Have No Valid Objection 
4. Based on Patrick's status as an unsecured, unperfected judgment creditor, Patrick 
has no priority interest in Learnframe's property. 
5. No other unsecured creditors have objected to the Writ of Execution, but even if 
they had objected, such objections would be overruled because there is no evidence of any 
unsecured creditor who levied against Learframe's property prior to plaintiffs. 
8 
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The APS Agreement Effected a f raudulent I ransfer 
6. A writ of execution is the proper vehicle for executing on property in the 
possession of the judgment debtor. See Utah R. Civ. P. 64E(a) ("A writ of execution is available 
t o s e i z e , M ' > : * ^ r r • ';• *'" ;* -,so- -1* '.•-"•- -*• ( V- r-r^ ' * r*r ,-> - - . ' V n - • '.''• --vip'..'' c n 1 1 ^ , r ' r* -• 
judgment."). 
7. . •* judgment creditor is permitted to execute on assets fraudulently transferred 
without bringing an action under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 
to -14 (the "Act"). See Utah Code Ann § 25-6-8 ("If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a 
claim., gains' 'V \*>^- •• "'i- ••••or, if the court orders, may lev] /' execution on the asset 
[fraudulently] transferred or its proceeds."); see also Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 
236, 239 (1.9 74) ("A judgment creditor may litigate the question of a fraudulent conveyance in a.. 
garnishment proceeding, in a creditor's bill in equity, or in an execution proceeding, provided 
that once contested the burden is upon the one alleging the fraudulent conveyance to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was in fact fraudulent."). 
8. In the instant case, Learnframe and APS's attempt to transfer ownership of 
Learnframe's assets was a fraudulent transfer under either Section 25-6-5 or Section 25-6-6 of 
the Act. 
Fraudulent Transfer Under Section 25-6-6 
9 . S e C i i ' ' * ' - •-•• ' " • ' J i l l ; - CiilMJi^, U . U " U l ! ; i , i > i l . . l l .; . JL* h tl '.' t [ ' V i I cLUUL' R ' , I! 
transfer. This section applies to the instant case because plaintiffs7 claims against Learnframe 
arose in or before December 2002 when this action was brought against Learnframe. 
9 
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10. Under Section 25-6-6, a creditor must show: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer; and (b) the debtor was 
insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6. Here, both of these elements are satisfied. 
The Transfer Was Not for Reasonably Equivalent Value 
11. First, the value of consideration received by Learnframe was not even remotely 
equivalent to the value of its property. The only documentary evidence in the record of the value 
of Learnframe's property at or about the time of the APS Agreement is the admission by 
Learnframe in its tax returns to the IRS that its property was worth $3,376,316. [PL Ex. 14.] 
12. Even if the Court were to ignore Learnframe's admission in its tax returns of the 
value of its assets, the Court is still persuaded that there wras great value in Learnframe's assets at 
the time of the APS Agreement. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Mr. DeYoung, 
who indicated that by his estimation, the value of Learnframe's assets at the time of the APS 
Agreement was $900,000 for the equipment and other tangible property, plus whatever 
Learnframe's intellectual property was worth. Mr. DeYoung conceded that Learnframe had 
"great potential" because its software, even today, is one of the better software packages in its 
industry. 
13. Notwithstanding the great value that APS received through the APS Agreement, 
Learnframe only received a forebearance from APS that APS would foreclose on the single 
Learnframe asset in which APS had received a security interest—an uncollected (and still 
uncollected today) receivable from Learn University. At that time, APS had no security interest 
10 
L\ UJI* •-.ncj ^caniuiiinc asset, and vv ould be able to do nothing 11101 e thai 1 bring suit against 
Leaniframe, seek a judgment like the dozens of other creditors of Leaniframe, and attempt to 
collect on that judgment as plaintiffs have done. Moreover, APS and Learnframe's own 
arguiTu-i: in thK <"o:i"? l '!\-J: ^d'jmtMi! r^vrrliior woi ild not be able to execi ite on I ,earnframe's 
assets anyway due to the IRS's levy. 
14. Under these cir. u^i^aiices, the Com t is persuauc. - ^  LL:L- V» •
 ; LLL>.V .nat 
Leaniframe would have transferred ownership of its assets to APS when APS had no perfected 
security interest in Learnframe's assets as a whole (but only a single uncollected receivable) was 
because Learnframe w a r ^ <• '••:)kr ? ? i^>re]Vi:-!J i*-;ir»r*^ r ••- *-r-"': ''",* v> : -h'-1':' 
Learnframe's assets from other creditors, including plaintiffs. 
15. Even taking into account Mr. De r oung's assessment of the value of Learnframe's 
assets, such a valuation would greatly exceed the value of APS's forbearance from suing 
Learnframe and attempting—with all of Learnframe's other creditors—to collect on any 
judgmen. it ma\ have recev^ .• >:">:TI Learnframe. 
Learnframe Was Insolvent or Became Insolvent 
16. Second, the evidence shows that Leaniframe was insolvent, or at minimum 
became insolvent as a result of the APS Agreement. 
17. Under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-3(1), "[a] debtor is insolvent if the sum of the 
subsection (2), "[a] debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is presumed 
to be insolvent." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-3(2). 
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18. Here, Leamframe does not deny that it was insolvent at the time it entered into the 
APS Agreement. Leamframe concedes that it was not paying its debts as they became due; that 
the sum of its debts far exceeded the value of its assets; and that it was undergoing severe 
financial difficulties at the time, having been sued or threatened with suit by many creditors. 
[Michael Memmott] 
19. hi sum, based on evidence before the Court, the Court concludes that the APS 
Agreement effected a fraudulent transfer under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6. 
Fraudulent Transfer Under Section 25-6-5 
20. Alternatively, plaintiffs have also established that a fraudulent transfer occurred 
under Section 25-6-5, which governs claims of creditors that arise before or after the fraudulent 
transfer. This statute is satisfied simply by a showing that a transfer is made "with actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." Id. § 25-6-5(1). 
21. Based on the foregoing analysis of Section 25-6-6, this requirement is satisfied 
because the Court concludes that the only credible reason for the APS Agreement was to shield 
Leamframe's assets from creditors, preferentially favoring APS. This conclusion is supported by 
a consideration of the various factors that are probative of actual intent, under Section 25-6-5(2), 
including whether: 
(1) "the debtor retained possession or control of the property 
transferred after the transfer"; 
(2) "the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed"; 
(3) "before the transfer was made . . . , the debtor had been sued or 
threatened with suit"; 
(4) "the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets"; 
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(5) "the value of the consid : i i ;ti :)n received by the debtor was 
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred"; and 
(6) "the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the 
transfer was made." 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6(2). 
22. Each of these factors is implicated here. Leamframe remained in possession and 
Leamframe's possession, as the APS Agreement permits, even though Leamframe has defaulted 
under the Agreement by not paying taxes, maintaining insurance, and rem.ami.ng solvent. APS 
and Leamframe failed to disclose the transfer to creditors, including the IRS, which had already 
levied. Leamframe had been sued or tlireatened with suit before the transfer. The transfer was of 
a.: '/'"" 1 -^ arn frame's assets, Fi.iial.ly, as detailed abc 'e in the anal] 'sis of Section 25-6-6, 
Leamframe was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made, hi sum, based 
on. a consideration of these various factors, the Court concludes that the AF.b Agreement effected 
a fraudulent transfer under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5. 
23. Under either Section 25-6-6 or 25-6-5, plaintiffs are not precluded from executing 
o:i :=v ".-"op'jn} :r. Learn (rami ; ;x)ssessh>. ,:- uhegudi} u^nsibrred. * iai: -/;h,. - . . .... -
6-8(2). 
Execution May Proceed Mi, ^erest 
24. The IRS's priority interest in Leamframe's property does not preclude pla.inti.ffs 
from proceeding to an execution sale. 
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25. Under the Utah UCC, junior secured creditors may sell collateral subject to senior 
liens. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-617 (providing that u[a] secured party's disposition of 
collateral after default transfers to a transferee for value all of the debtor's rights in the collateral" 
and "discharges any subordinate security interest or other subordinate lien," but that the 
transferee takes the collateral subject to "any other security interest or other lien"). 
26. The same is true in the context of real property, where a junior lien holder's 
foreclosure may proceed subject to the senior lien, even though the foreclosure is insufficient to 
eliminate the senior lien against the property. 
27. Nothing in Rule 64E prohibits execution on encumbered property. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 64E ("A writ of execution is available to seize property in the possession or under the 
control of the defendant following entry of a final judgment or order requiring the delivery of 
property or the payment of money."). 
28. The Court is unaware of any authority that would prevent execution under these 
circumstances. 
29. Plaintiffs are entitled to proceed with the execution. However, plaintiffs shall 
give notice of the IRS's tax levy to any person who purchases Learnframe's property at the 
execution sale because the IRS's interest shall remain attached to the property after the sale. 
DATED this 3*0 day o f _ J ^ A p ^ 5 2006. 
BYTHELCOURT 
Royal XHansen 
Third District Judge 
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